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The Electric Grid at a Crossroads:
A Regional Approach to Siting
Transmission Lines
Alexandra B. Klass∗
The current regulatory framework for approving long-distance, interstate
electric transmission lines does not match the physical aspects of the
interstate electric grid, regional electricity markets, or the growing but
dispersed renewable energy sources increasingly used to power the grid.
Despite the interstate nature of the electric grid and electricity markets, the
states have virtually complete authority over the siting and permitting of
interstate transmission lines. Continuing state authority over the
development of the interstate transmission grid is puzzling when compared
to the nation’s network of interstate natural gas pipelines, for which
regulatory authority was transferred to the federal government in the 1940s.
The question for this Article is whether the history surrounding the
transfer of regulatory authority over interstate natural gas pipelines can
be instructive in planning for the future of the electric grid. This Article
shows that that there was a moment in time in the 1940s when natural
gas, which for a century had been limited in its commercial use because of
lack of transportation from well sites to cities, became a critical energy
resource for the entire nation. At that time, Congress responded by
creating a federal regulatory process to build the interstate pipeline
network necessary to transport this resource after state regulatory
authorities had blocked such pipelines.
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This Article then suggests that the electric grid is nearing a crossroads
that justifies a similar shift in regulatory authority over the grid, although
not necessarily using the same framework Congress created for siting
interstate natural gas pipelines. Instead, this Article proposes a regional
model for siting interstate transmission lines rather than the purely
federal approach used for interstate natural gas pipelines. It sets forth
various options for regional siting approaches, including interstate
compacts under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to create separate, regional
siting authorities; granting Regional Transmission Organizations
(“RTOs”) siting authority over interstate transmission lines within their
footprints; and federal mandates on state public utility commissions and
courts to consider regional benefits and needs in making siting and
eminent domain determinations.
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INTRODUCTION
The current regulatory framework for approving long-distance,
interstate electric transmission lines does not match the physical
aspects of the interstate electric grid, regional electricity markets, or
the growing but dispersed renewable energy resources increasingly
used to power the grid.1 Despite the interstate nature of the electric
grid and electricity markets, the states have virtually complete
authority over the siting and permitting of interstate transmission
lines.2 Continuing state authority over the development of the
interstate transmission grid is puzzling when compared to the nation’s
network of interstate natural gas pipelines, for which regulatory
authority was transferred to the federal government in the 1940s.3 The
question for this Article is whether the history surrounding the
1 See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CAPITALIZING ON THE EVOLVING POWER SECTOR:
POLICIES FOR A MODERN AND RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 28-33 (2013) (discussing
flaws in the existing regulatory regime for siting interstate electric transmission lines);
MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 77 (2011) (concluding that
existing electric transmission line siting procedures are a “significant hurdle” to
necessary transmission system expansion and proposing new processes for planning
interregional transmission line expansion and cost allocation); Alexandra B. Klass,
Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079 (2013) (suggesting that states ensure
their eminent domain laws governing electric transmission lines reflect their policy
goals for expansion of renewable energy use); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J.
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism
Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012) (suggesting modifications to state-centered
electric transmission line siting regimes to recognize the regional and national scope
of the electric grid); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Grid Governance: The Role of a National
Network Coordinator, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1993 (2014) [hereinafter Grid Governance]
(proposing the creation of a federal “network coordinator” to address electric grid
expansion needs rather than a complete transfer of siting authority from the states to
the federal government); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission
Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1018-19 (2009) (contending that the problem
of cost allocation in transmission line expansion is a bigger problem than restrictive
state siting laws); Joel F. Zipp, Amending the Federal Power Act: A Key Step Toward an
“Energy Security and Supply Act of 2009” for the New Administration, 21 ELECTRICITY J.
6 (2008) (proposing federal legislation that would transfer siting and eminent domain
authority over interstate electric transmission lines from the states to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission).
2 BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 1, at 28-33.
3 See Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 101-02
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing federal process for siting and approving interstate natural
gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act); Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1859-61
(discussing Natural Gas Act and natural gas pipeline siting); Robert R. Nordhaus &
Emily Pitlick, Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Regulation, 30 ENERGY L.J. 85, 88-89 (2009)
(providing additional background on the regulatory scheme underlying the Natural
Gas Act).
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transfer of regulatory authority over interstate natural gas pipelines
from the states to the federal government can be instructive regarding
how to plan for the future of the electric grid. This Article first
concludes that the history of interstate natural gas pipeline siting
authority provides a pathway away from state regulation. However,
this Article also concludes that in the case of interstate electric
transmission lines, a regional approach rather than a purely federal
approach is a better match for the physical and market characteristics
of the grid as well as modern policy preferences regarding future
electricity resources.
This Article shows that there was a moment in time in the 1940s
when natural gas, which for a century had been limited in its
commercial use because of lack of transportation from well sites to
cities, became a critical energy resource for the entire nation. At that
time, Congress responded by creating a federal regulatory process to
build the interstate pipeline network necessary to transport this
resource after state regulatory authorities had blocked such pipelines.4
This Article then suggests that the electric grid is nearing a similar
crossroads that justifies a similar shift in regulatory authority over the
grid, although not necessarily using the same framework Congress
created for siting interstate natural gas pipelines. The circumstances
that justify such a change in regulatory authority include: (1) the
physical nature of the grid which long ago grew from local and statebased origins to a regional, multi-state network that facilitates
interstate, wholesale electricity market transactions; (2) the growth of
renewable energy, particularly wind energy which is often located far
from population centers and can only be transported by interstate
transmission lines,5 in contrast to fossil fuels which can be transported
by train, pipeline, truck, or ship throughout the country; (3) the
growth of Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) —
federally-approved nonprofit entities that manage the transmission of
electricity within multi-state regions in many parts of the country,
operate wholesale market transactions for electricity, and oversee the
planning of transmission grid expansions within their footprints; and
4 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1859-65. See generally Alexandra B. Klass &
Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA
L. REV. 947 (2015) (discussing states’ refusal to approve interstate natural gas
pipelines and Congress’s response).
5 While some forms of renewable energy, such as rooftop solar and small-scale
wind energy can be transported over local distribution lines or a small-scale “microgrid,” such distributed renewable energy resources currently make up only a small
portion of total renewable energy use.
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(4) developing state and federal clean energy policies such as state
renewable portfolio standards and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA’s”) 2014 proposed greenhouse gas (“GHG”) rule for
existing power plants,6 which has the potential to fundamentally shift
the dominant electric energy sources throughout the country in future
years toward increased renewable energy.
The purpose of this Article is to show that the physical and market
factors that created the current regulatory regime have changed in a
manner that is quite similar to the transition that occurred in the
natural gas industry many decades ago.7 This review also suggests that
policymakers should consider a regional approach to transmission line
siting in addition to a federal approach or the status quo.
Notably, we often pay little attention to the central role the electric
grid plays in our lives until it breaks down, at which point modern life
as we know it comes to a screeching halt. As described in a 2013 U.S.
House of Representatives Report, the nation’s electric grid is both a
critical asset and highly vulnerable:
The U.S. bulk-power system serves more than 300 million
people and is made up of more than 200,000 miles of
transmission lines, and more than 1 million megawatts of
generating capacity, and is valued at over $1 trillion. . . . The
components of the grid are highly interdependent and, as
history has shown, a line outage or system failure in one area
can lead to cascading outages in other areas. For example, on
August 14, 2003, four sagging high-voltage power lines in
northern Ohio brushed into trees and shut off. Compounded
by a computer system error, this shut-down caused a cascade
6 See Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.
epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/clean-power-plan-proposed-rule (last visited Feb.
26, 2015).
7 Issues surrounding the potential means of addressing the inevitable state
opposition to reducing state regulatory authority over the siting of interstate
transmission lines, and whether principles of federalism support such a change are
matters scholars and other experts have explored in earlier work. For a discussion of
these issues, see, for example, Klass, supra note 1 (arguing that increased federal
authority over interstate transmission line siting is desirable but is strongly opposed
by many state regulatory authorities); Klass & Wilson, supra note 1 (discussing
federalism issues in electric grid development); Ostrow, Grid Governance, supra note 1
(discussing federalism issues in electric grid development); Rossi, supra note 1, at
1019 (discussing the historically state-centered approach to regulating electric energy
transmission); and Zipp, supra note 1, at 6 (proposing legislation that would create a
federal regulatory scheme to govern electric transmission projects). These issues will
not be addressed in detail here.
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of failures that eventually left 50 million people without power
for two days across the United States and Canada. This event,
the largest blackout in North American history, cost an
estimated $6 billion and contributed to at least 11 deaths.8
The Congressional Research Service has expressed similar concerns
about the impact of significant weather events, such as Hurricane
Sandy in 2012, on the nation’s aging electric grid.9
Despite the interstate nature of the electric grid and its importance to
interstate commerce and national security, states exercise virtually
exclusive control over the siting and approval of interstate electric
transmission lines. By contrast, the federal government, through the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) controls the siting
and approval of interstate natural gas pipelines. The reasons for this are
not obvious. Both the electric grid and the interstate natural gas
pipeline network are massive, interlinked, interstate energy
transportation networks designed to bring energy resources from
generation and distribution sites to suppliers and users. But each
regulatory system arose during different political and economic times
and in response to different constellations of actors, assumptions
regarding the scarcity or availability of the energy resource in question,
the role of federal and state governments in regulating energy
transportation, and varying concerns over monopoly power. Many of
these factors with regard to the actors, technologies, resource
availability, and economic forces that underlie these regulatory regimes
have changed dramatically in the decades that followed their creation.
This Article illustrates how the nation’s sources of electricity, the
nature of the electric grid itself, and federal and state policies for
powering the grid have changed so significantly in recent years that a
new regulatory framework for siting interstate transmission lines is
needed to address these shifts. Today there are federal and state policies
in place to develop wind, solar, and other renewable electricity

8 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ELECTRIC GRID VULNERABILITY: INDUSTRY
RESPONSES REVEAL SECURITY GAPS 4 (2013).
9 See RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42923, ELECTRICAL POWER:
OVERVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES 8 (2013) (“The recent damage sustained to the
electrical grid by Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey and difficulty in
restoring electricity service underscore the age and fragility of the power system, and
how electricity service might benefit from hardening and modernization of various
power systems.”). See generally The Switch: America’s Electrical Grid, BURN: AN ENERGY
JOURNAL (June 17, 2013), http://burnanenergyjournal.com/the-switch-americaselectrical-grid/ (documenting a series of stories on the electricity grid, how it works,
the players, and what happens when it breaks down).
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resources that are located far from population centers in places like
Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, rural Texas, and the Mojave
Desert. Unlike fossil fuel resources that can be transported to load
centers by train, truck, pipeline, or ship, large-scale wind and solar
energy can, for now, only be transported through transmission lines.
With today’s national and regional electric grid, it no longer makes
sense for states to be wholly responsible for reviewing and approving
long-distance, interstate transmission lines. This Article then concludes
that while a centralized, federal framework could address this issue, a
regional approach for siting interstate electric transmission lines may be
a better match for today’s regional electricity grids, markets, and
resources. A regional approach for siting interstate transmission lines is
possible if states entered into interstate compacts under existing federal
law, if Congress granted RTOs siting authority for interstate
transmission lines within their footprints, or if Congress required state
public utility commissions (“PUCs”) and courts to consider regional
benefits in siting and eminent domain decisions.
Part I explores the interstate natural gas market and its transportation
network. Unlike interstate electric transmission lines, siting and
eminent domain authority for interstate natural gas pipelines were
transferred from the states to the federal government in the 1940s.
Thus, this Part examines the factors that led to this major displacement
of state authority in favor of federal authority in order consider its
potential application to interstate electric transmission lines.
Part II turns to the creation of the U.S. electric grid and interstate
electric transmission markets. It explains how the grid developed from
a local, central station model to the regional grids that transport
electricity today. It also summarizes briefly the development of state
and federal regulation of electricity markets, electric transmission
networks, and the siting of interstate electric transmission lines.
Part III details the contours of the modern, regional grid, along with
the regional electricity markets that federal law, state law, and market
actors have created. It also highlights the significant changes in recent
years to the sources of energy used to generate electricity and the
impact of those changes on the future of the electric grid. Finally, it
describes current interstate transmission projects designed to
transport renewable energy, particularly wind energy, in multiple
regions of the country, as well as the roadblocks many of these
projects are facing in connection with the state siting process.
Part IV then proposes that with regard to transmitting electric
energy, the United States is approaching a crossroads similar to the
one that existed for natural gas in the 1940s. At that time, cities across
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the country began to transition away from manufactured gas, which
could be created within city limits from a variety of energy sources
such as coal and oil, to relying more heavily on natural gas, which
required interstate pipelines to transport the gas from distant well sites
to population centers. A similar transition is now occurring with
regard to renewable electric energy resources, but the fact of this
transition has been somewhat masked because we still have ample
non-renewable energy resources to rely upon for electricity. Using
coal, natural gas, or uranium to generate electricity has historically
allowed for multiple means of transporting the energy resources
themselves: coal and uranium can be transported by truck and train to
power plants near population centers and natural gas can be
transported by pipeline to the same destinations. Renewable energy,
by contrast, can only be transported through transmission lines and,
like natural gas, renewable energy, particularly wind energy, is a
locally-constrained resource that is often most abundant far from
population centers.
This Part then suggests that a regional approach to siting interstate
electric transmission lines may be preferable to the purely federal
approach used for interstate national gas pipelines. This is because a
regional approach to siting interstate transmission lines better matches
the physical dimensions of the electric grid, existing electricity
markets, and current electric transmission needs. There are at least
three models for siting interstate transmission lines on a regional level.
First, states could enter into interstate compacts under the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 to create regional siting agencies with permitting
authority over interstate transmission lines within those states.10
Second, Congress could transfer siting authority to RTOs in areas
where RTOs exist. Although RTOs are non-governmental
organizations and are thus not traditional siting authorities, there is
precedent both within and outside of the electricity realm for granting
siting authority with federal oversight to such entities where
appropriate. Third, Congress could leave siting authority with the
states but require state PUCs and state courts to expressly consider
regional transmission needs and regional energy needs in making
siting and eminent domain decisions.
In suggesting a regional approach to interstate transmission line
siting, this Article recognizes that state interests in protecting their
own regulatory authority, as well as the politics of today’s Congress,
make it difficult to envision implementing such an approach in the
10

Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2012); see infra Part IV.A.
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near future. Nevertheless, a major regional or national disruption, like
the natural gas shortages on the East Coast in the 1940s, or the 2003
blackouts, which led to the creation of new regulatory bodies to
govern the grid, can change political sentiment very quickly.11 When
that day arrives, it will be important to consider a regional approach to
interstate transmission line siting that matches today’s regional grid
and regional electricity resources in additional to a federal approach or
the status quo. Indeed, what may seem like a radical approach today
may appear inevitable in the future.
I.

THE NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION NETWORK: HISTORY AND
REGULATION

This Part provides a history of the natural gas transportation
network with a focus on how the industry’s development influenced
the regulation of the network of interstate pipelines that transports
natural gas across the country.12 It explains how and why Congress
transferred siting and eminent domain authority for interstate natural
gas pipelines to the federal government in the early part of the
twentieth century. In doing so, this Part provides an example of
Congress shifting jurisdiction over siting and eminent domain
authority for a major U.S. energy transportation network away from
the states in order to meet national energy transportation goals. This
example is instructive in considering the potential for similar shifts in
siting electric transmission lines discussed in Parts II–IV.
Natural gas seeps have been observed since ancient times.13 In the
early 1800s people knew natural gas springs could produce heat and
light, but transportation technology at the time did not permit
capturing or transporting the gas long distances for use elsewhere.14
As a result, throughout the 1800s and into the mid-1900s, cities relied
on manufactured gas, or “town gas” for lighting, cooking, and
heating.15 Manufactured gas is similar in chemical composition to
11 See infra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (discussing events leading up to
enactment of the Natural Gas Act); infra notes 126–28 and accompanying text
(discussing the legislative response to the 2003 Northeast blackouts).
12 For a more detailed discussion of the history and regulation of the interstate
natural gas pipeline network, see Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 4, at 989-1009.
13 See History, NATURALGAS.ORG (Sept. 20, 2013), http://naturalgas.org/overview/
history/.
14 See CHRISTOPHER J. CASTANEDA, INVISIBLE FUEL: MANUFACTURED AND NATURAL GAS
IN AMERICA, 1800–2000, at 38 (1999); ARLON R. TUSSING & CONNIE C. BARLOW, THE
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE, AND ECONOMICS 9-10 (1984).
15 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 4.
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natural gas but has the benefit of being able to be made at any location
from coal, oil, wood, or other cheap organic material.16
Major natural gas wells were discovered in Ohio in the 1840s but
lack of transportation options limited commercial development.17 By
the 1850s only industries and towns located very close to wells could
make use of natural gas.18 Although associated natural gas was
discovered with oil in the first U.S. oil boom in Titusville,
Pennsylvania in the late 1850s, the gas was simply a nuisance to oil
drillers as it caused well blowouts and fires and could not be captured
and put to economic use.19 As a result, when drillers found natural gas
deposits without accompanying oil they were usually abandoned.20
It was not until 1872 that the first miles of iron pipe were
constructed to create the first natural gas transportation in the
Pennsylvania Oil Region for the “waste gas” found with the oil.21
Pittsburgh was the first major city in the United States to use natural
gas for industrial purposes on a large scale, made possible by discovery
of gas wells in close proximity to the city in the early 1870s.22 In the
1880s, natural gas companies began forming and developing more gas
fields in Pennsylvania, transporting gas to households in nearby
municipalities and to local glass and steel plants.23 Pittsburgh had
historically used tremendous amounts of coal to fuel its iron industry
and the city’s air quality was poor.24 In the 1880s, the New York Times
reported that Pittsburgh’s adoption of natural gas would improve its
air quality.25 Overall, natural gas offered many benefits over
manufactured gas throughout the country, namely, twice as much
energy (“Btu”) per unit of volume, no poisonous carbon monoxide,
16 See id.; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from
Wellhead to Burnertip, 25 ENERGY L.J. 57, 60 (2004) (originally published in 9 ENERGY
L.J. 1 (1988)).
17 The same challenge exists today in North Dakota, which is producing massive
amounts of natural gas from oil wells, but instead of capturing and making
commercial use of the gas, oil well operators are flaring quantities of natural gas worth
$100 million per month into the atmosphere because of the lack of sufficient natural
gas pipeline infrastructure. See Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 4, at 1009-15
(discussing natural gas flaring practices by North Dakota oil well drillers).
18 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 42.
19 See id.; TUSSING & BARLOW, supra note 14, at 9.
20 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 42-43.
21 See id. at 43-44; TUSSING & BARLOW, supra note 14, at 9.
22 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 44-45.
23 See id. at 45.
24 See id. at 44.
25 See id.
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and elimination of the soot and sulphur compounds that were emitted
from manufactured gas works.26
Local availability of lower cost natural gas, with its higher Btu
content, encouraged industry to begin using natural gas to
manufacture iron, steel, chemical products, and glass on a more
widespread basis.27 By 1885, 150 companies were chartered to sell gas
in Pennsylvania and further gas discoveries in Ohio and West Virginia
enabled cities in that region to begin using natural gas from nearby
wells.28 Indiana gas fields were discovered in the late 1800s, which
increased both demand for and production of natural gas resources.29
While these eastern gas fields were soon depleted, drillers discovered
new gas fields in Oklahoma and Kansas which followed the same
boom and bust pattern. From 1880 to 1910, the use and
transportation of natural gas expanded nationwide, leading to new
natural gas pipeline networks and markets.
In the late 1890s Standard Oil formed the East Ohio Gas Company
to produce and deliver gas to customers in Ohio, and Hope Natural
Gas Company acquired gas wells in West Virginia.30 The public was
becoming increasingly dependent on natural gas during this period
and so states created their own regulatory commissions to regulate
intrastate gas pipelines and their rates.31 In 1918, drillers discovered
the huge Panhandle Field in northern Texas, and in 1922, new sources
of gas were found in the Mid-Continent Field near the borders of
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.32 Between 1927 and 1931, about twelve
major gas transportation systems developed, all over 200 miles long.33
By the late 1920s, four public utility holding companies dominated
the gas industry, operating as a powerful cartel often referred to as the
“Power Trust.”34 During the Depression, shortages and high gas prices,
monopoly power, and a reliance on manufactured gas characterized
the eastern United States while in Texas, Kansas, Oklahoma, and
Louisiana, an oversupply of natural gas remained unconnected to

26

See TUSSING & BARLOW, supra note 14, at 28.
See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 49.
28 See id. at 50.
29 See id. at 51.
30 See id. at 71.
31 See The History of Regulation, NATURALGAS.ORG (Sept. 20, 2013), http://naturalgas.
org/regulation/history/.
32 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 84.
33 See TUSSING & BARLOW, supra note 14, at 33.
34 CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 89-90.
27
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markets.35 Pressure for greater gas industry regulation grew. Congress
directed the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to study and report
on allegations of discrimination and exercise of monopoly power in
the natural gas industry. The FTC report showed that the four holding
companies controlled more than 60% of all natural gas produced in
1934 as well as 58% of U.S. pipelines.36 The FTC found that 40% of
gas used in the United States was shipped in interstate commerce and
seven million end users consumed it for various purposes in thirtyfour states.37
The FTC’s report resulted in several pieces of legislation, including
the Natural Gas Act of 1938, which gave the Federal Power
Commission (“FPC”) authority to regulate sales of natural gas for
resale in interstate commerce, transportation of natural in interstate
commerce, and facilities used for such sales and transportation.38 The
Natural Gas Act created a process where a proposed interstate natural
gas pipeline could obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity from the FPC — now FERC — after a review of the
economic and environmental impacts of the pipeline.39
After World War II, major northeast cities shifted quickly from
manufactured gas to natural gas when southwestern natural gas
arrived via long-distance pipelines.40 But the existing pipelines could
not meet the growing demand and state governments, the coal
industry (a source of manufactured gas), and railroad interests
blocked efforts to construct new pipelines in Pennsylvania.41
Landowners in other states also blocked pipeline efforts. Natural gas
shortages during the winter of 1946–1947 resulted in nearly 50,000
workers being laid off from jobs, and raised alarms in Congress.42
35 See id. at 103-04 (noting that many pipelines carried less than 50% of their
capacity because of low demand or lack of reliable supplies while in Texas trillions of
cubic feet of natural gas were vented as drillers were only interested in the oil from the
wells and not the associated gas); M. ELIZABETH SANDERS, THE REGULATION OF NATURAL
GAS: POLICY AND POLITICS, 1938–1978, at 24 (1981).
36 CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 107.
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2012) (stating pipeline rates must be just,
reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory and subject to federal agency oversight).
39 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)–(h) (2012); Minisink Residents for Env’t Pres. & Safety
v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing federal process for siting
and approving interstate natural gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act); Klass &
Wilson, supra note 1, at 1859-60.
40 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 132.
41 Id.
42 Amendments to the Natural Gas Act: Hearings on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292,
H.R. 2569, and H.R. 2956 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 80th
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During subsequent debates, House members heard testimony
regarding the workers laid off during gas shortages, the rapid
depletion of gas storage fields during the winter, and the industries
that could not meet production commitments.43 In 1947, Congress
enacted new legislation granting federal eminent domain authority to
any interstate natural gas pipeline holding a certificate of public
convenience and necessity under the Natural Gas Act.44
In 1948, Philadelphia became the first major eastern city to convert
from manufactured gas to natural gas and receive gas by long-distance
pipelines from the southwest.45 Between 1950 and 1956, five pipelines
of 1,000 miles or more were built from the Gulf Coast to northern and
eastern markets.46 As the Panhandle and Mid-Continent Fields
continued producing natural gas, pipeline companies tripled and
quadrupled their capacity by the 1980s.47 While Congress and FERC
have experimented over the years with more and less regulation of the
natural gas industry, federal permitting and eminent domain authority
over interstate natural gas pipelines has remained constant.
Until recently, natural gas was used primarily for heating rather
than electricity because of its high price as compared to coal and other
baseload electricity resources.48 The shale gas revolution that begin in
approximately 2007, however, has caused gas prices to fall
significantly in the United States, allowing natural gas to replace coal
as a source of baseload electricity in many parts of the country.49
There are significant air emission benefits associated with burning
natural gas for electricity as opposed to coal in the form of significant
Cong. 46 (1947) (statement of Simeon Willis, Governor of Kentucky) [hereinafter
Amendments to the Natural Gas Act Hearings]. Committee members heard testimony
regarding the approximately 49,000 workers laid off during gas shortages, id. at 620
(statement of James W. Haley, Attorney, National Coal Association), the rapid
depletion of gas storage fields during winter, id. at 186 (statement of John Siggins, Jr.,
Chairman, Pennsylvania PUC), and the industries that could not produce or purchase
necessary materials, including a pipeline company that could not expand its capacity
because it had reduced its gas deliveries to the company that manufactured the needed
pipe, id. at 183-84.
43 See id. at 183-84, 186 (Statement of John Siggins, Jr., Chairman, Pennsylvania
PUC); id. at 188 (statement of William A. Daugherty, Attorney); id. at 620 (statement
of James W. Haley, Attorney, National Coal Association).
44 CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 139; see Natural Gas Act Amendments, Pub. L. No.
80-245, 61 Stat. 459 (1947).
45 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 139-40.
46 See TUSSING & BARLOW, supra note 14, at 46.
47 See id.
48 LINCOLN DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 125-27 (West Acad. Publ’g 2015).
49 See infra Part III.B (discussing energy sources used for electricity).
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reduced emissions of pollutants such as mercury, SO2 and CO2.50
Nevertheless, many energy policy experts remain concerned about the
nation becoming too dependent on natural gas for electricity
generation because of GHG emissions associated with the hydraulic
fracturing process itself and adverse impacts of natural gas use on
continued renewable energy development.51
There are currently about 2.6 million miles of interstate and
intrastate natural gas pipelines in the United States.52 These include
almost 200,000 miles of gathering pipelines in the country; these lines
collect gas from production areas and transport it to processing
facilities where it is then sent to transmission pipelines after the
refining process.53 As of 2007, interstate pipelines carried 81% of the
natural gas in the United States to local distribution companies for
retail sale to customers.54 A majority of the country’s gas thus flows in
pipelines subject to FERC’s regulation regarding construction, rates,
and terms of service.
Between 2000 and 2011, pipeline companies applied for and
received FERC approval for more than 16,000 miles of interstate gas
pipelines, 14,600 miles of which had been constructed and put in
service by 2011.55 In order to expedite the permitting process, the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct 2005”) created an optional prefiling procedure and made FERC the lead agency responsible for
coordinating federal agency authorizations and compliance with the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) during pipeline
certificate application reviews.56 An Executive Order was also issued in
50 See, e.g., DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 126-27 (describing environmental
benefits and costs of electricity produced by natural gas); Press Release, Nat’l Oceanic
& Atmospheric Admin., New Study: U.S. Power Plant Emissions Down (Jan. 9, 2014),
available at http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/csd/news/2014/148_0109.html (reporting on
new study showing shift from coal-fired power to natural gas-fired power for
electricity has resulted in a reduction of pollution associated with power plants).
51 See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, The Potential Downside of Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 2014, at B3 (presenting problems associated with increased use of natural gas
for generating electricity).
52 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-221, PIPELINE PERMITTING:
INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE NATURAL GAS PERMITTING PROCESSES INCLUDE MULTIPLE
STEPS, AND TIME FRAMES VARY 4 (2013).
53 See id.
54 See CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, U.S. NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE 3
(2012).
55 INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASS’N OF AM. FOUND., NORTH AMERICAN NATURAL GAS
MIDSTREAM INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH 2035: A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE 8-9 (2011).
56 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 15 U.S.C. § 717n (2012); PAUL W. PARFOMAK,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43138, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS PIPELINES: PROCESS AND
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2012 to “institutionalize best practices and reduce the amount of time
required to make permitting and review decisions for infrastructure
projects, including pipelines.”57 A 2013 Congressional Research
Service report noted that federal and state agencies have attempted to
be responsive to the shale gas boom, and that twice as much
transmission capacity was added to the U.S. pipeline network in 2008
as in 2007.58 The same report cited statistics showing that most
interstate natural gas pipelines can move from the pre-filing stage to
certificate within twelve months.59
II.

THE ELECTRICITY TRANSPORTATION NETWORK: HISTORY,
REGULATION, AND CURRENT CHALLENGES

This Part turns from the natural gas transportation network to the
electricity transportation network. It begins with Thomas Edison and
the construction of the first transmission lines. It then describes the
development of the early electric grids and electric utilities, state and
federal electricity regulation, and the regulatory regime governing the
siting and approval of interstate transmission lines. Thus, this Part sets
the stage for Part III, which explores the new demands placed on the
grid by policies encouraging the use of renewable energy as well as the
new regional grid actors, such as RTOs, that have fundamentally
transformed grid planning, management, and operation in many parts
of the country.
A. The First Electric Grids and the Rise of Electric Utilities
In the United States, Thomas Edison started working on the
incandescent bulb in 1877, joining a group of inventors already
developing a power supply that would be economical and steady.60
Edison ultimately succeeded in creating a lighting system that would
operate in a central station, sending electricity through wires and
switches to incandescent bulbs.61 After a period of testing and
TIMING OF FERC PERMIT APPLICATION REVIEW 2 (2015).
57 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 30 (citing Exec. Order No.
13604, 77 C.F.R. 18887 (2012)).
58 See PARFOMAK, supra note 56, at 8 & fig.2.
59 See PARFOMAK, supra note 56, at 7-9. For a discussion of some of the safety
issues associated with the build-out of oil and gas pipelines as a result of the shale oil
and gas “revolution,” see Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 4.
60 See ERNEST FREEBERG, THE AGE OF EDISON: ELECTRIC LIGHT AND THE INVENTION OF
MODERN AMERICA 29 (2013).
61 See id. at 43.
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formulation, Edison identified 1,500 potential future customers who
were burning coal-gas in about 20,000 lamps, mapped out routes for
ditches and switches,62 and carefully studied the existing gas
infrastructure, as he planned to use abandoned gas pipelines to carry
electrical wires to homes and replace gaslights with electric fixtures.63
In 1879, San Francisco became the first city in the world to install a
centralized electric generating station to distribute electricity to power
arc lamps at different points in the city,64 and in 1880, New York lit
almost a mile of Broadway with twenty-three lights.65 Electric
companies usually installed a town’s entire street lighting system at
their own expense in order to enter into potentially lucrative
municipal contracts.66
The introduction of single-phase alternating current (“AC”) and
transformers in the late 1880s would change the movement of
electricity and the extent of electric utility service.67 George
Westinghouse, the famous industrialist who drilled for natural gas in
his Pittsburgh backyard, collaborated with other inventors and built
on earlier developments to create the modern transformer.68 The
transformer allowed voltage to be increased (“stepped up”) as it left
the generator, and to be decreased (“stepped down”) to low voltage at
the end of a long transmission line.69 Westinghouse recognized that
with AC, he might ship electricity over long distances to factories and
homes. In this way, power could be used for many purposes beyond
than incandescent lighting70 and generating stations with their
accompanying smoke and noise could be located closer to fuel
sources71 and further from customers.72
Direct current (“DC”) had been Edison’s preferred method of
transmitting electricity, but DC had significant limitations.73 After his
62 JILL JONNES, EMPIRES OF LIGHT: EDISON, TESLA, WESTINGHOUSE, AND THE RACE TO
ELECTRIFY THE WORLD 77 (2003).
63 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 60.
64 DAVID J. MUCHOW & WILLIAM A. MOGEL, ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS
§ 81.01[1] (2014).
65 See FREEBERG, supra note 60, at 48.
66 See id. at 61.
67 See CHARLES DAVID JACOBSON, TIES THAT BIND: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
DILEMMAS OF URBAN UTILITY NETWORKS, 1800–1990, at 79 (2000).
68 JONNES, supra note 62, at 132.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 132-33.
71 Id. at 135-36.
72 JACOBSON, supra note 67, at 79.
73 JONNES, supra note 62, at 133-36. At that time, DC over 1,000 volts was taken
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initial success with AC, Westinghouse strung three miles of wire
between Pittsburgh and East Liberty to test the system.74 The
company’s first customer was a Buffalo, New York department store.75
Twenty-seven new customers in various locations placed orders for
service soon after that,76 and after one year in business, Westinghouse
Electric Company had sixty-eight AC central stations under contract
or completed.77 Developments such as the commercial introduction of
competitive AC motors made it increasingly apparent that AC was
more than a temporary threat to DC, and Edison Electric Company
ultimately merged with a successful AC firm to become the General
Electric Company in 1892.78 The period between 1893 and 1903
witnessed increasing use of AC, which allowed transmission distances
to jump from two miles to over 100 miles.79 In 1896 Westinghouse
transmitted 11,000 volts from the new hydroelectric generating plant
at Niagara Falls to Buffalo, New York across a line spanning twentytwo miles.80 Long-distance hydroelectric power transmission began in
California in the 1890s.81
The introduction of AC and long-distance transmission encouraged
the consolidation of electric utilities.82 In Philadelphia in 1895, there
were more than twenty electric companies operating technologically
incompatible systems that used varying voltage and AC at different
frequencies.83 By 1902, the Philadelphia Electric Company had
consolidated all of the city’s neighborhood companies into one
utility.84 Companies that consolidated prospered from “increased
reliability, economies of scale, fuel cost differentials and [ability to

from generators and transmitted over longer distances (which was possible because of
the higher voltage) and then transferred into a series of batteries. After the batteries
charged, they were disconnected and reconnected in parallel, which created a low
voltage that the distribution network could handle. THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS OF
POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880–1930, at 85 (1983). AC
transmission would eventually replace the use of storage battery substations. Id.
74 JONNES, supra note 62, at 136.
75 Id. at 137.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 144.
78 RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 13 (1999).
79 MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 64, § 81.01[1].
80 HIRSH, supra note 78, at 13; MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 64, § 81.01[1].
81 HUGHES, supra note 73, at 265.
82 MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 64, § 81.01[1].
83 Id.
84 Id.
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manage] peak loads.”85 In 1905, California Gas & Electric
incorporated as Pacific Gas & Electric, and by 1906 had grown
through a series of mergers and acquisitions to include ten
hydroelectric plants, interconnecting transmission lines, two longdistance transmission lines to the San Francisco Bay area, and gas and
electric utilities that distributed power to customers in cities including
San Jose, Oakland, Berkeley, and San Francisco.86 Between 1882 and
1905, Chicago had granted electric companies twenty-nine charters
for nonexclusive franchises, and outlying towns granted eighteen
charters during the same years, hoping to spur competition and lower
service costs.87 Samuel Insull — the man credited with “founding the
business of centralized electric supply” — saw the potential in
combining AC and steam turbines to produce massive quantities of
power,88 but he would need a large and varied customer base to make
it profitable. Insull instructed General Electric to build a 5,000kilowatt turbine — a huge generating capacity for the time — and
installed it in 1903 at the Chicago Edison Company where Insull was
president.89 He bought out competitors, merged their equipment with
his own, and promoted electricity consumption at different times of
the day to produce cheaper electricity (which further attracted
customers), enlarging to become Commonwealth Edison.90 As other
electric companies followed Insull’s approach in the early decades of
the 1900s, cities like New York and Detroit were eventually served by
monopolies rather than competitive power markets.91
By the 1890s, towns were building their own waterworks, and many
thought they should be the entity to provide electricity to their
citizens as well.92 Public officials began comparing lighting bills and
were angry to find that customers were paying dramatically different
prices.93 City governments sometimes engaged in “municipalization,”
where they purchased the assets of utility companies and operated
85

Id. § 81.01[2].
HUGHES, supra note 73, at 276.
87 HIRSH, supra note 78, at 14.
88 Id. at 13. Invented in 1884 in England, steam turbines work by high-pressure
steam pushing against blades that are attached to and turn a shaft, creating a rotating
motion that powers a generator. Id. In 1911 12,000 kW units replaced Insull’s smaller
turbine, allowing Commonwealth Edison to see electricity throughout Chicago and
the surrounding area. Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 13-14.
91 Id. at 14.
92 FREEBERG, supra note 60, at 196.
93 Id. at 197.
86
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them, or built their own utility service and forced private utilities to
sell.94 In some places it worked: the mayoral candidate of Detroit ran
on the issue in 1889, won, and established municipal ownership of the
power plant and streetlight network in 1895.95 The annual cost to run
each streetlight went from $132 to $87 in 1898.96 Municipal
ownership became a popular idea,97 gaining strength so that by the
1912 presidential election, public ownership of electric utilities was an
issue of importance to voters.98 Between 1910 and 1920, some
Midwestern cities’ voters opted to make their electric utility companies
municipally owned and operated.99 But even at the apex of this
movement, municipalities did not run the majority of electric
utilities.100 The threat that a local government might take over electric
service did cause private utilities to become more amenable to
regulation, as a better alternative to losing the market altogether.101
B. State and Federal Regulation of Public Utilities and Grid Expansion
During the 1920s, vertically integrated public utilities constructed
intrastate and interstate transmission lines to serve customers in their
in-state territories. As a consequence of the growing efficiencies in the
electric industry from 1900 to the 1930s, small public and private
94 HIRSH, supra note 78, at 14. In 2013, Boulder, Colorado began the process of
municipalizing its electricity system and taking over transmission lines and other
facilities from Xcel Energy in order to rely more heavily on renewable energy instead
of fossil fuels. See Herman K. Trabish, A Utility in the Making: The Municipalization of
Boulder, Colorado, UTILITY DIVE, Aug. 27, 2014). Xcel Energy filed a lawsuit against the
city to block the municipalization process in 2014. See Brian Holton Henderson, The
Future of Public Power, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brianholton-henderson/the-future-of-public-powe_b_5501074.html (last updated Aug. 17,
2014, 5:59 AM EDT).
95 HIRSH, supra note 78, at 14.
96 Id.
97 FREEBERG, supra note 60, at 196.
98 BILL BECK, INTERCONNECTIONS: THE HISTORY OF THE MID-CONTINENT AREA POWER
POOL 3 (1988).
99 Id.
100 FREEBERG, supra note 60, at 199. In 1902 there were 815 municipal power
companies and more than 1,000 by 1907, comprising 30% of electricity providers in
the United States. HIRSH, supra note 78, at 14-15. As of 2014, the percentage of total
electricity sold by the various types of power providers was as follows: investor-owned
utilities (68.5%), publically owned utilities (14.4%), electric cooperatives (12.8%),
federal power agencies (less than 1%), and power marketers (4.3%). AM. PUB. POWER
ASS’N, 2014–15 ANNUAL DIRECTORY & STATISTICAL REPORT 26, available at
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/USElectricUtilityIndustryStatistics.pdf.
101 FREEBERG, supra note 60, at 199.
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power companies merged with, purchased power from, or were
acquired by larger private utility companies.102 By the late 1920s, the
sixteen largest electric power private holding companies, which often
owned a number of electric utilities in various jurisdictions, controlled
more than 75% of all U.S. generation.103 States’ PUCs began to regulate
utility rates in exchange for grants to utilities of exclusive service
territories. In this way, states, generally with the support of the
utilities they regulated, created the rate-regulated, natural monopoly
framework in electricity that continues to exist in most states today.104
Also in the 1920s, utilities continued to seek economies of scale and
worked together to integrate their systems by constructing interstate
transmission lines and creating the start of the regional grids that exist
today. When states attempted to regulate those interstate electricity
sales, the Supreme Court held that such regulation violated the
dormant Commerce Clause, creating a regulatory gap known as the
“Attleboro gap” after the primary Supreme Court decision restricting
state regulation.105 In 1935, Congress filled that gap by enacting the
Federal Power Act (“FPA”) granting FERC’s predecessor, the Federal
Power Commission (“FPC”), exclusive authority to regulate the
transmission of electricity in interstate commerce and the wholesale
sale of electricity in interstate commerce.106 The law left the regulation
of retail electricity transactions to the states as well as the siting of
interstate and intrastate transmission lines.107
102 HUGHES, supra note 73, at 391-92; MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 64,
§ 81.01[1]–[2].
103 HUGHES, supra note 73, at 391-92; JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY,
ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 372 (West 2d ed. 2011) (describing industry
consolidation).
104 DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 308-12, 317-18. Beginning in the 1990s, many
states “restructured” their regulated utilities by splitting the formerly vertically
integrated utility functions of generation, transmission, and distribution, and
attempted to create markets and competition for generation and distribution within
the state. Today, about half the states have some market competition for electricity
services. See id. at 428-29.
105 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5-8 (2002) (describing Attleboro gap and
Congress’s subsequent enactment of the Federal Power Act to fill that gap by
authorizing federal regulation of interstate wholesale sales of electricity and
transmission of electricity in interstate commerce); Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro
Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927).
106 See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5-8.
107 See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824; New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5-8; see
also Brief of Amici Curiae the Honorable Joseph T. Kelliher et al. in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Edison Elec. Inst. v. Piedmont Envtl. Council,
558 U.S. 1147 (2010) (No. 09-343), 2009 WL 3420493 [hereinafter Kelliher Amici
Brief] (“In 1935, electricity delivery was essentially local in nature, and it is thus not
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The FPC and FERC used their Congressional authority over
wholesale electricity sales and transmission of electricity in interstate
commerce to issue a series of orders to ensure reasonable rates and
non-discrimination in wholesale electricity markets and transmission
access.108 Congress provided additional authority to FERC to pursue
these goals in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(“PURPA”), which allowed independent electricity producers with
“qualifying” facilities access to the power grid and to make electricity
sales.109 Then, in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress authorized
FERC to require utilities to provide access to transmission services on
an open and non-discriminatory basis and to encourage transmission
planning by RTOs, states, and utilities.110
Today, RTOs and Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) manage the
grid and regional markets for wholesale power in many, but not all,
states.111 In the regions where RTOs and ISOs have formed, those entities
engage in regional grid planning, working with public utilities, states, and
other grid participants. Despite the move to regional grid planning in
parts of the country where RTOs exist, Congress has left the actual
permitting, siting, and eminent domain authority for interstate
transmission lines with the states, subject to a few exceptions detailed
below. In many ways, this is not surprising. Electricity began as a
localized resource and, unlike natural gas, which has always required
interstate pipelines to transport the energy resource to customers,
traditional electricity resources such as coal, natural gas, and uranium did

surprising that the Federal Power Act did not provide for federal transmission siting
by the Federal Power Commission, the predecessor agency to the FERC. Instead,
Congress reserved siting of transmission facilities to the states.”).
108 See Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1363-65 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (describing FERC orders and amendments to the FPA). FERC jurisdiction
over wholesale electricity sales and the transmission of electricity in interstate
commerce extends to non-retail electricity sales and transmission throughout the
country except for the states of Texas, Alaska, and Hawaii, which are not connected to
the interstate grid and thus do not transmit electricity in interstate commerce. See
Klass, supra note 1, at 1098-99 (discussing FERC regulation of transmission of
electricity in interstate commerce); Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1843-44
(discussing Texas’s lack of connection to rest of U.S. grid and lack of FERC
jurisdiction over Texas electricity sales and transmission); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S.
at 6-8 (discussing single-state grids in Hawaii, Alaska, and Texas).
109 See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 481-83 (discussing PURPA).
110 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 9; DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48 at 173-74, 393
& n.1, 394-96; Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1814-25 (summarizing key statutes
and FERC orders).
111 See infra Part III.
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not need transmission lines for long-distance transportation.112 Instead,
utilities could transport these energy resources by train, truck, or pipeline
to local or regional power plants, which could then convert these energy
resources into electricity, and deliver that electricity to customers on local
transmission lines. But as states and utilities attempt to increase the
percentages of renewable energy in their electricity mix, the grid begins to
resemble the interstate natural gas pipeline network prior to the 1940s,
with all its state-based limitations, before Congress transferred siting and
eminent domain authority to the federal government.
C. State Siting and Eminent Domain Authority for Transmission Lines
As noted above, although FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale
power sales in interstate commerce and transmission of electricity in
interstate commerce, states retain jurisdiction over retail electricity
sales and the siting, approval, and grant of eminent domain authority
for virtually all transmission lines, including interstate transmission
lines.113 This stands in contrast to the regulatory structure for
interstate natural gas pipelines.114 As a result, a utility or other
transmission operator that wishes to build an interstate transmission
line must obtain siting permission and eminent domain authority from
all of the states in the line’s path, usually through the state PUCs, and
follow each state’s permitting process and standards.115 In some states,
transmission operators must also obtain approval from counties and
other local governmental entities before constructing a line.116 The
transmission siting laws in each state vary, but generally require the
transmission operator (whether a public utility or a private
transmission company) to establish the “need” for the line, the effect
of the line on reliability, alternatives to the proposed line, and the
potential environmental impacts of the line.117 If successful, the
transmission operator receives a “Certificate of Need” or a “Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity.”118
In virtually all states, once a transmission operator receives its
certificate, it can exercise the power of eminent domain if it fails to
112 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1805-08, 1811-12 (discussing growth of
the transmission grid and challenges associated with transmitting renewable energy).
113 Klass, supra note 1, at 1101-02.
114 See supra Part I; see also Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 4, at 953-89.
115 Klass, supra note 1, at 1101-02.
116 Id. at 1101 & n.134.
117 Id. at 1102.
118 Id.
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reach voluntary agreements with all landowners for the required
easements.119 Generally, states define transmission lines as a “public
use,” which allows the use of eminent domain under both the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as state constitution with
similar provisions that allow the taking of private property for a public
use upon payment of just compensation.120 In a few states, public
utility and/or private transmission operators can exercise eminent
domain authority without first obtaining a certificate.121 Some states
allow public utilities, but not private transmission operators, to
exercise eminent domain authority under the theory that such
privately built lines are not a “public use.”122
The problem with individual states determining whether there is a
“need” for an interstate transmission line or whether the line is a
public use is that a single state legislature, PUC, or court will
necessarily focus on the need of the citizens of its own state.123 In most
states, interstate transmission lines provide regional or national
benefits that may overshadow any in-state benefits. This is particularly
true for long-distance transmission lines designed to bring wind
energy from one state to population centers several states away
without any on-ramps or off-ramps in between. What is the benefit or
public use to the states in between who will not see lower electricity
rates, increased clean energy use in the state, or new markets for their
own generation resources? While such states may see improved grid
reliability because the new line will benefit the grid as a whole, that

119

Id. at 1123, app. A.
Id. at 1089, 1102-03.
121 Id. app. A.
122 Id. at 1123-26, app. A.
123 See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 1, at 28-33 (noting that some states
may reject projects that do not directly benefit them); MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note
1, at 77 (finding that “current siting procedures are biased against approving interstate
transmission projects and are a significant hurdle to efficient transmission
expansion.”); Klass, supra note 1, at 1135-36 (“[T]he problem with a single state
determining whether an interstate transmission line is a public use . . . is that a single
state legislature or state court must focus primarily on the citizens of its own state.”);
Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1827-31 (“Leaving siting authority for interstate
transmission lines exclusively within state (and sometimes even local) authority
causes significant problems because, for the most part, states consider only in-state
benefits in their siting determinations . . . .”); Ostrow, Grid Governance, supra note 1,
at 2023 (some states “focus exclusively on intrastate benefits” to “determine whether a
proposed project is in the public interest”); Rossi, supra note 1, at 1019 (explaining
how states’ self-interests affect need determinations); Zipp, supra note 1 (stressing the
need for comprehensive regional plans that can stretch across state lines and borders).
120
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may be little consolation when weighed against the physical impacts to
private lands, views, and natural resources caused by the line.
Although state law governs the vast majority of interstate
transmission line approvals, there are some circumstances where
federal law rather than state law controls the siting and approval of
transmission lines. However, such authority is quite limited
geographically and does little to address the poor “fit” between state
regulatory siting authority for transmission lines and the regional scale
of the transmission grid and electricity markets.
First, the federal government has plenary authority over siting
transmission lines on federal lands, which make up a significant
percentage of land in many western states, although only a very small
percentage of land in the rest of the country.124 The FPA also provides
limited authority to construct transmissions lines to connect federally
permitted hydropower facilities to the existing grid.125
Beyond such projects on federal land or for federal hydropower
projects, Congress created limited federal siting authority to address
transmission congestion in section 1221 of the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (“EPAct 2005”) in response to the 2003 Northeast blackouts.126
In section 1221 of EPAct 2005, Congress directed the U.S. Department
of Energy (“DOE”) to conduct transmission congestion studies every
three years to identify areas of the country experiencing transmission
constraints or congestion.127 The DOE may formally designate those
areas as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (“NIETCs”)
and, once an area receives a NIETC designation, FERC may exercise
“backstop” siting authority if a state declines to approve a line within a
NIETC.128 However, decisions by the federal courts of appeal have
significantly limited DOE and FERC’s authority in this area, and the
statutory provisions have not resulted in a single federal approval of a
transmission line.129
124 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1825-27. For a map showing the significant
variation in percentage of federal lands in the fifty states, see CHRISTINE A. KLEIN,
FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C. BIRDSONG, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 36 (3d ed. 2013).
125 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2012) (FERC’s hydropower licensing authority includes
siting authority over related transmission lines); James J. Hoecker & Douglas W.
Smith, Regulatory Federalism and Development of Electric Transmission: A Brewing
Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71, 82 (2014).
126 See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 461-64.
127 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1816-17.
128 Id. at 1816-19 (discussing EPAct 2005).
129 See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1107 (9th Cir.
2011) (invalidating DOE’s NIETCs in the Southwest and Mid-Atlantic regions for
failure to adequately consult with affected states in making NIETC designations);
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In one significant decision, Piedmont Environmental Council v.
FERC,130 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
language in EPAct 2005 granting FERC transmission line permitting
jurisdiction when a state commission has “withheld approval [of a
permit application] for more than 1 year” did not include situations
where a state commission had denied a transmission line
application.131 Instead, the court held that FERC’s authority was
limited to circumstances where the state commission did not have
authority to act or acts inappropriately by including “project-killing”
conditions on the permit.132
This major limitation on FERC’s ability to site transmission lines in
areas experiencing congestion prompted a dissent from Judge Traxler,
who cited the circumstances leading up to EPAct 2005 and some of
the legislative history that supported a broader reach of FERC siting
authority.133 He focused first on the shift since the enactment of the
FPA in the 1930s from electricity being produced, transmitted, and
consumed in the same general geographic area to today’s longdistance, interstate transmission grid.134 He then cited a 2002 DOE
report warning that construction of new transmission lines has been
unable to keep up with electricity demand, which has created
bottlenecks that have increased consumer costs and the chances of
blackouts.135 That report went on to recommend that FERC should be
authorized to act “if state and regional bodies are unsuccessful in
siting and permitting national interest transmission lines.”136 Judge
Traxler also cited to statements by Senate Energy and Natural
Resource Committee Chairman Domenici that reflected the same
concerns contained in the 2002 Department of Energy report.137 But
Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558
U.S. 1147 (2010).
130 Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d 304.
131 Id. at 310, 313-14 (quoting Federal Power Act § 216(b)(1)(C)(i), 16 U.S.C.
§ 824p (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132 Id. at 313-14.
133 Id. at 320, 325-26 (Traxler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
134 Id. at 320-21.
135 Id. at 321.
136 Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY 58-59
(2002), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/transmissiongrid.pdf); see also Kelliher Amici Brief, supra note 107, at 21-26 (citing legislative
history supporting argument that Congress intended to grant FERC authority to
override state agency denials of transmission line permits to address the changing
needs of the interstate transmission grid such as grid reliability and to promote
development of renewable energy resources).
137 See Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 321.
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the majority did not agree with this analysis and thus, despite the fact
that Congress and federal agencies completed studies similar to those
done in 1940s for interstate natural gas pipelines, EPAct 2005 has not
resulted in any real shift of transmission siting authority away from
the states.
Finally, under a separate provision of EPAct 2005, Congress has
granted two of the four federal power marketing administrations —
the Western Area Power Administration (“WAPA”) and the
Southwestern Power Administration (“SWPA”)138 — authority to
design, develop, construct, or operate a new electric power
transmission project within any state in which WAPA or SWPA
operates if the Secretary of Energy determines that such project will
reduce congestion of electricity transmission, is necessary to
accommodate increased demand for electric transmission capacity,
and meets other requirements.139 This statutory authority also allows
WAPA and SWPA to participate with other entities in designing,
constructing, or operating such projects, therefore facilitating publicprivate collaboration on transmission lines.140 Notably, existing case
law has held that electric transmission lines proposed by federal power
administrations need not comply with state siting requirements or
obtain state siting permits and may take private property using federal
eminent domain authority.141 Thus, there is the potential for private
parties seeking to construct transmission lines in states where WAPA
and SWPA operate to work with those power marketing

138 “Four federal Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs) operate electric
systems and sell the electrical output of federally owned and operated hydroelectric
dams in 33 states.” Federal Power Marketing Administrations Operate Across Much of the
United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 12, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11651. They are the Bonneville Power Administration
(“BPA”), the Western Area Power Administration (“WAPA”), the Southeastern Power
Administration (“SEPA”), and the Southwestern Power Administration (“SWPA”). Id.
“Of the four PMAs, BPA and WAPA are much larger in terms of the volume of
electricity marketed than SWPA and SEPA.” Id. There is no PMA coverage in the
northeastern states and for much of the Midwest. Id. Federal power agencies supply
less than 1% of U.S. electricity needs. See supra note 100.
139 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 16421(a) (2012).
140 Id. § 16421(b).
141 See, e.g., United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cnty., 547
F.3d 943, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding WAPA was not required to comply with
California law); Citizens & Landowners Against the Miles City/New Underwood
Powerline v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 683 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding
WAPA was not required to comply with South Dakota laws governing the siting and
permitting of transmission lines or obtain a state siting permit prior to planning and
constructing a new transmission line in the state).
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administrations on projects and avoid the state transmission siting
process. To date, neither WAPA nor SWPA have used their siting and
eminent domain authority under EPAct 2005.
III. THE MODERN ELECTRICITY GRID: ENERGY SOURCES, TRANSMISSION
LINES, AND REGIONAL PLANNING
This Part describes in more detail the modern electric grid and
highlights major interstate transmission projects, as well as the
difficulty of obtaining approval in all necessary states for such projects.
It then turns to the changing nature of the energy sources powering the
grid with a focus on the growing use of renewable energy, particularly
wind, to generate electricity in many parts of the country. This Part
ends with a discussion of the growing focus on RTOs as major players
in managing the grid in many regions of country as well as wholesale
markets for electricity within those regions.
A. Existing Transmission Infrastructure, Future Needs, and Proposed
Interstate Transmission Projects
Today, electricity from nearly 7,000 power plants travels over
450,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines in the United States,
connecting with nearly 6 million miles of lower voltage distribution
cables, to provide power to homes, businesses, and industrial
facilities.142 The U.S. electric grid constitutes an $876 billion asset
managed by over 3,000 utilities serving nearly 300 million
customers.143 Unlike the interstate natural gas pipeline network, which
has no state or regional boundaries, there are three separate and
distinct electricity grids within the continental United States — the
142 See ECON. DEV. RESEARCH GRP., INC., AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, FAILURE TO ACT: THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CURRENT INVESTMENT TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 4-5
(2011), available at http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Issues_and_Advocacy/Our_
Initiatives/Infrastructure/Content_Pieces/failure-to-act-electricity-report.pdf (stating that
there are over 450,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines in the United States); MASS.
INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 4 (stating that there are 6 million miles of low-voltage
distribution lines); Ken Wells et al., Crumbling U.S. Grid Gets Jolt Driving Smart Houston
Power, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2014, 3:00 AM PDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-06-25/crumbling-u-s-grid-gets-jolt-driving-smart-houston-power (stating that
7,000 power plants supply electricity through 450,000 miles of high-voltage transmission
lines).
143 See HARRIS WILLIAMS & CO., TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION INFRASTRUCTURE 2
(2014), available at http://www.harriswilliams.com/sites/default/files/industry_reports/
ep_td_white_paper_06_10_14_final.pdf?cm_mid=3575875 (stating that the grid
services 300 million customers); Wells et al., supra note 142 (stating that the grid is a
$876 billion asset and is serviced by over 3,000 utilities).
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Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”). There is essentially
no transfer of electricity between the three interconnections.144
Figure 1: U.S. Interconnections145

These grids make up 73%, 19%, and 8%, respectively, of electricity
sales in the United States.146
Many experts warn that the U.S. transmission grid must be
modernized and expanded to maintain reliability, to address
increasingly severe weather events brought about by climate change,
to address cyber security concerns, and to integrate more domestic
renewable energy into the grid to achieve federal and state climate
change goals.147 According to experts, power outages are becoming
144 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Learn More About Interconnections, ENERGY.GOV,
http://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation/
transmission-planning/recovery-act-0 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (explaining the
function of the three main “interconnections” in the United States). The North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”), a non-governmental
organization, works with eight regional entities to ensure bulk power reliability
throughout the United States. About NERC, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP.,
http://www.nerc.com/ABOUTNERC/pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
145 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. ET AL., AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE: TECHNOLOGY AND
TRANSFORMATION 568 fig.9.4 (2009).
146 MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 3.
147 See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing the aging nature of the
transmission grid); BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 1, at 28-33 (arguing that the
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more frequent in the United States, and in order to maintain even
current levels of grid reliability, the electric industry must make total
investments on the scale of $1.5 to $2 trillion dollars and investments
in transmission and distribution alone of nearly $900 billion.148
Likewise, a 2013 White House report noted that “[s]evere weather is
the number one cause of power outages in the United States and costs
the economy billions of dollars a year in lost output and wages,
spoiled inventory, delayed production, inconvenience and damage to
grid infrastructure.”149 More important, the report points out that the
“aging nature of the grid,” most of which was constructed over a
grid’s infrastructure will need to be updated in order to meet renewable energy
targets); ECON. DEV. RESEARCH GRP., supra note 142, at 4-9 (arguing that without
increased investment in grid infrastructure, we will not be able to meet the growing
demands for energy); MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 77 (arguing that one factor
requiring an increased investment in transmission capacity is the need for more
renewable energy sources); Klass, supra note 1, at 1116 (arguing that more
transmission needs to be built in order to maintain reliability and meet new renewable
energy targets); Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1802 (arguing that the transmission
infrastructure must be improved in order to incorporate domestic renewable energy);
Ostrow, Grid Governance, supra note 1, at 1995-96 (arguing that the state-centered
regulatory system is ineffective for regulating such a sprawling, interconnected
system, such as the grid); Rossi, supra note 1, at 1018-33 (arguing that existing state
regulation of the grid is inadequate to address competitive wholesale markets and
climate change goals). See generally EDISON ELEC. INST., TRANSMISSION PROJECTS: AT A
GLANCE, at iii (2014) (showing increases in transmission investment from 2011–2013
but then a projecting a slight decline in investment from 2013–2016); Investment in
Electricity Transmission Infrastructure Shows Steady Increase, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17711 (reporting
that after a thirty-year decline in transmission investment, more recent trends from
1997–2012 show increased investment in transmission infrastructure by public
utilities and other power providers to improve reliability and to connect load centers
to renewable energy resources).
148 See, e.g., MARC W. CHUPKA ET AL., EDISON FOUND., TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S
POWER INDUSTRY: THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE 2010–2030, at iv-xi (2008), available at
http://assets.fiercemarkets.com/public/sites/energy/reports/transformingamericaspower
.pdf (summarizing costs of grid investment); Massoud Amin, Toward a More Secure,
Strong and Smart Electric Power Grid, IEEE SMART GRID (IEEE, Piscataway, N.J.), Jan.
2011, available at http://smartgrid.ieee.org/january-2011/67-toward-a-more-securestrong-and-smart-electric-power-grid (“In the electricity sector, outages and power
quality disturbances cost the economy, on average, more than $80 billion annually
and sometimes as much as $188 billion in a single year.”); Wells et al., supra note 142
(“Power outages are up 285 percent since 1984 and the U.S. ranks last among the top
nine western industrialized nations in the average time that it takes to get the light
back on after power failures. Outages cost businesses as much as $150 billion a year in
lost continuity . . . .”).
149 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INCREASING ELECTRIC
GRID RESILIENCE TO WEATHER OUTAGES 4 (2013), available at http://energy.gov/sites/
prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%20Resiliency%20Report_FINAL.pdf.
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period of more than one hundred years, makes the country more
susceptible to severe weather-related power outages.150 The report also
warns that the number of outages “is expected to rise as climate
change increases the frequency and intensity of hurricanes, blizzards,
floods and other extreme weather events.”151 “In 2012, the United
States suffered eleven billion-dollar weather disasters — the secondmost for any year on record, behind only 2011.”152
As for augmenting the nation’s supply of renewable electricity, new
long-distance interstate electric transmission lines are a critical aspect
of achieving that goal. Unlike competing sources of electricity such as
coal, uranium, and natural gas, which can be transported to consumers
via pipelines, rail, truck, or ship, large-scale renewable energy such as
wind or solar energy can only be transported through transmission
lines.153 As a result, expanding the electric transmission system is
critical to increasing the nation’s supply of renewable electricity
because these sources of energy are generated in states like Kansas,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and rural parts of Texas,
Illinois, Oregon, and Iowa, which are generally far from load centers.154
The regulatory framework for transmission lines that gives states
virtually exclusive siting and eminent domain authority for both
interstate and intrastate transmission lines has significant implications
for the future of the grid. A 2011 interdisciplinary study by MIT
entitled The Future of the Electric Grid devotes an entire chapter to
regulatory policy affecting transmission expansion, with particular
focus on the issue of integrating large-scale renewable generation.155 It
concludes that current siting procedures are often biased against
approving interstate transmission projects and are a significant barrier
to adequate and efficient transmission expansion.156 The report
recommends better planning of regional transmission projects, better
compilation of data on the U.S. bulk power system, the use of regional
and interconnection cost allocation procedures to better share the cost
150

Id.
Id.
152 Id.
153 As noted earlier, although rooftop solar and other distributed renewable energy
resources do not rely on transmission lines, such energy resources so far make up only
a small percentage of total renewable electricity resources although that percentage is
likely to increase substantially in the future. See supra note 5.
154 See United States — Average Annual Wind Speed at 80 m, NAT’L RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/80m_wind/USwind300dpe4-11.jpg (last
visited Apr. 4, 2015) (map showing high potential wind areas in purple).
155 MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 77-108.
156 Id. at 100.
151
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of long-distance transmission, and enhanced federal siting authority
for interstate transmission lines.157
A 2013 report by the Bipartisan Policy Center entitled Capitalizing
on the Evolving Power Sector, Policies for a Modern and Reliable U.S.
Electric Grid also highlights the limitations of the state siting process
for interstate transmission lines, particularly those high-voltage, longdistance lines necessary to transport renewable energy to load
centers.158 According to the report:
Siting new transmission lines is often a prolonged, expensive,
and contentious undertaking. . . . In recent decades . . . the
evolution of interstate and regional electricity markets has
increasingly necessitated long-line, interstate transmission
projects. Further, the extent of [variable energy resource]
integration that will be required by existing state renewable
portfolio requirements, and the reality that many renewable
resources are located at a distance from load, will likely create
a greater need for new long-line transmission in some regions.
. . . Under the current siting regime, the developer of a
multistate transmission line must obtain requisite approvals
from state and local authorities along the full length of the
line . . . . For their part, individual state authorities may be
bound by state statutes to accept or reject the project on the
basis of their in-state transmission needs, or the in-state
benefits that the project offers. In these cases, states may not
be empowered to consider the regional benefits of a proposed
project. Thus, a project that transmits power generated in one
state, passes through a second state, and serves load in a third
state could have difficulty winning approval from regulators in
the second state. In some states, regulators might even be
required by law to reject a project that does not serve load
within the state’s boundaries, even in cases where the project
delivers broader benefits to the region at large that the state
would share in over time.159
Despite these regulatory hurdles, both public utilities and private or
“merchant” transmission companies160 are attempting to build long157

Id. at 102-04.
BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 1, at 5.
159 Id. at 28-29; accord Hoecker & Smith, supra note 125, at 86-88 (discussing state
siting barriers to interstate transmission projects).
160 “[M]erchant transmission companies . . . generate revenue solely from contracts
158

University of California, Davis

1926

[Vol. 48:1895

distance, interstate transmission lines to improve grid reliability and
transport new sources of renewable energy to load centers. Recent
efforts include:
•

The Montana Alberta Tie Line, a 214-mile, 230-kV
merchant line running between Lethbridge, Alberta
and Great Falls, Montana to transport Montana wind
energy.161

•

The Zephyr Transmission Project, owned by DukeATC, a proposed 950-mile 500-kV line from
southeastern Wyoming to Las Vegas, Nevada designed
to connect wind-rich areas of Wyoming to load centers
in California and the southwestern United States and
expected to be in service by 2020.162

•

The $6.8 billion Texas Competitive Renewable Energy
Zone (“CREZ”) project consisting of eight years of
planning and new construction of 3,600 miles of highvoltage transmission lines across portions of central
and West Texas to integrate 16,000 MW of wind
energy into the Texas grid.163

•

The SunZia Southwest Transmission Project, two
proposed bi-directional 500-kV lines in Arizona and

they sign with electricity generators to transmit electricity . . . for delivery to [utilities
and other electricity providers to sell to] the retail market.” Klass, supra note 1, at
1081 n.7 (citing Heidi Werntz, Let’s Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant
Transmission, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 424 n.13 (2011)). By contrast, public
utilities and independent transmission companies receive a cost-based rate of return
from electricity users through the state public utility commission ratemaking process.
Id. at 1121.
161 Montana-Alberta Tie-Line, ENBRIDGE, http://www.enbridge.com/DeliveringEnergy/
Power-Transmission/Montana-Alberta-Tie-Line.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
162 EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 147, at 35.
163 See Daniel Cusick, New Power Lines Will Make Texas the World’s 5th-Largest
Wind Power Producer, CLIMATEWIRE (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/stories/1059995041. It is important to note that Texas is unique in its
ability to plan and site large-scale transmission lines for renewable energy
development because it has its own grid (ERCOT) and the state includes both major
population centers and significant wind energy resources. See Klass & Wilson, supra
note 1, at 1843-47 (discussing CREZ projects and uniqueness of Texas); Matthew L.
Wald, Wired for Wind, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2014, at B1 [hereinafter Wired for Wind],
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/business/energy-environment/texasis-wired-for-wind-power-and-more-farms-plug-in.html (reporting on completion of
Texas CREZ projects).
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New Mexico designed to spur development of
renewable energy in those states and anticipated to be
in service by 2020.164
•

Five separate DC high-voltage transmission projects by
Clean Line Energy Partners, a merchant transmission
company, each travelling between 200 and 900 miles
designed to bring wind energy to population
centers.165

•

The Multi-Value Projects (“MVPs”) in the
Midcontinent Independent System Operator (“MISO”)
region designed to enhance grid reliability and help
the MISO states meet renewable portfolio standards by
allowing more transmission of wind energy
throughout the region, and imposing cost sharing
among utilities within MISO.166

164 See Welcome to the SunZia Transmission Project, SUNZIA, http://www.sunzia.net/
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
165 See Projects, CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, http://www.cleanlineenergy.com (last
visited Feb. 19, 2015). The five Clean Line Energy Partners projects are the Rock Island
Clean Line (bringing wind energy from northern Iowa to Illinois and states east of Illinois),
the Grain Belt Express Clean Line (bringing wind energy from western Kansas to Missouri,
Illinois and states east of Illinois), the Plains & Eastern Clean Line (bringing wind energy
from the Oklahoma Panhandle region to southeastern states), the Centennial West Clean
Line (line from Northeast New Mexico to California designed to develop wind and solar
energy in the region), and the Western Spirit Clean Line (bringing renewable power from
New Mexico to Western markets working together with the Centennial West Clean Line).
See id. The Centennial West Clean Line had entered into a partnership with WAPA and
thus may be able to take advantage of the federal siting authority discussed in Part II.C,
under section 1222 of EPAct 2005. See generally Press Release, W. Area Power Admin. &
Clean Line Energy Partners, Centennial West Clean Line, Western Sign Agreement for
Transmission Project Development (June 18, 2012), available at http://www.
centennialwestcleanline.com/sites/centennial_west/media/docs/FINAL_Centennial_West_P
ress_Release_061812.pdf (announcing the partnership between WAPA and Clean Line
Energy Partners). The Plains & Eastern Clean Line has sought to enter into a similar
relationship with SWPA under section 1222 of EPAct 2005. See Letter from Tom Kiernan,
CEO, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, to Ernest Moniz, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (May 15,
2014), available at http://www.plainsandeasterncleanline.com/sites/plains_eastern/media/
docs/AWEA_Letter_of_Support.pdf (urging Department of Energy “to move forward as
expeditiously as possible to a final decision under your Section 1222 authority on the
Plains & Eastern Clean Line and other projects that will facilitate the deployment of wind
energy”).
166 See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 771-75 (7th Cir. 2013)
(describing MISO’s MVP projects as lines designed to facilitate increase in renewable
energy generation and integration within MISO region); Glen Boshart, MISO: MVP
Project Benefits Larger than Previously Thought, SNL (Oct. 1, 2014, 6:16 PM ET),
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•

The Great Northern Transmission Line, a 500-kV line
designed to run between Winnipeg, Manitoba and
northeastern Minnesota to transport both hydropower
and wind energy and proposed to be in service by
2020.167

•

The Northern Pass Transmission Line, a 187-mile
power line to connect significant hydropower
resources in Quebec to population centers in New
England.168

Both public utilities and private merchant lines are investing in new,
large-scale transmission projects, many of which are DC rather than
AC. Although the U.S. electric grid runs predominantly on AC, many
of the proposed long-distance transmission lines for wind are DC
because DC is more efficient and results in less line losses, even
though it limits the number of “on ramps” and “off ramps” along the
path of the line.169 Notably, the time, cost, and multi-state regulatory
hurdles associated with such lines are significant and most of the
projects listed above are still in the state permitting process. Moreover,
there are far fewer large-scale renewable energy projects proposed for
the eastern United States, highlighting the difficulty of constructing
new transmission lines east of the Mississippi River.170
Projects of this magnitude can take more than a decade to plan,
propose, and obtain regulatory approval from multiple states prior to

https://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/Article.aspx?cdid=A-29379703-12582 (reporting on
a 2014 MISO study showing that the MVPs will offer “between $13.1 billion and $49
billion in net benefits over the next 20 to 40 years, an increase of approximately 50%
from the 2011 estimates” and that the MVP projects will help states meet their
renewable energy requirements because the increased transmission will reduce wind
curtailments due to insufficient transmission); see, e.g., EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note
147, at 68 (describing Mid-American Energy Expansion as “an integral part” of the
portfolio of MISO MVP projects).
167 EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 147, at 78-79.
168 See Sam Evans-Brown, Understanding Northern Pass, N.H. MAG. (Jan. 2014),
http://www.nhmagazine.com/January-2014/Understanding-Northern-Pass/.
169 See Klass, supra note 1, at 1111 & n.196 (providing descriptions of AC and DC
and benefits and drawbacks of each type of current).
170 See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 1, at 1021-22 (discussing state opposition to
interstate transmission lines in Arizona and Connecticut); Evans-Brown, supra note
168 (discussing controversy over Northern Pass project); see also BIPARTISAN POLICY
CTR., supra note 1, at 28-29 (stating that regulatory approval for interstate
transmission projects is difficult to obtain and discussing a project denial by
regulatory authorities in Arkansas).
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the actual construction process.171 Then there are often more years of
delay due to legal challenges to the lines on grounds ranging from
whether one or more states properly issued the certificate of need, to
whether an RTO is justified in imposing the cost of such transmission
lines on all utilities in the region, to whether the line constitutes a
“public use” justifying eminent domain under various state laws.172
This stands in contrast to interstate natural gas pipelines, which can
often be built on a twelve-month to two-year timeline with one-stop
shopping at FERC.173
For instance, in the summer of 2014, the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission (“PSC”) held hearings to determine the need for and
environmental impacts associated with the Badger-Coulee Line. MISO
had designated this 345-kV line as a high-priority line that would
offset the need for about $160 million to $180 million in lower voltage
transmission system upgrades in western Wisconsin, provide local
utilities with increased access to wholesale energy markets, and
establish another pathway for renewable energy into Wisconsin and to
load centers in other states.174 During the Wisconsin PSC hearings,
landowners and citizen groups questioned “why Wisconsinites should
have to give up their land and views so generators in the Dakotas can
ship surplus energy to the East Coast.”175
Similar concerns have been raised as public hearings in Missouri for
the Grain Belt Express, one of the Clean Line Energy Partner DC
171 See Alison Silverstein, Presentation at the NCEP Transmission Technology
Workshop: Transmission 101, at 51 (Apr. 20–21, 2011), http://www.naruc.org/grants/
Documents/Silverstein%20NCEP%20T-101%200420111.pdf. See generally NAT’L ELEC.
MFRS. ASS’N, SITING TRANSMISSION CORRIDORS — A REAL GAME OF CHUTES AND LADDERS
(2011), available at http://www.nema.org/Communications/Documents/tC_gameboard_
vertical.pdf (providing the gameboard for a game that explains how the siting process
works).
172 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 483-85 (2005) (“The causes of the
growing shortage of transmission capacity are well known and well documented.
FERC has not yet devised and implemented a method of encouraging adequate
investment in transmission capacity, and NIMBY-based opposition to proposed
transmission expansion projects dooms most projects at the state and local agencies
that now have authority to authorize or veto such projects.”).
173 See supra notes 44, 58–59 and accompanying text.
174 News Release, Am. Transmission Co., PSC Deems Badger Coulee Transmission Line
Project Application Complete (Apr. 30, 2014), available at http://www.atcllc.com/whatscurrent/psc-deems-badger-coulee-transmission-line-project-application-complete/.
175 Danielle Endvick, Farmers, Rural Landowners Opposing Transmission Project Say
It Puts Their Lifestyle . . . On the Line, COUNTRY TODAY (June 16, 2014, 8:22 AM),
http://www.thecountrytoday.com/front_page/article_5963e286-f559-11e3-9dc90019bb2963f4.html.
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transmission lines in the Midwest designed to transport wind energy
to population centers in the east.176 The Grain Belt Express would
travel through four states, including Missouri.177 At the hearing, critics
of the line argued the costs to Missouri landowners exceeded the
project’s benefits. One landowner stated, “Grain Belt says they’re going
to bring power to Missouri. They mean through Missouri . . . . If the
East Coast wants wind power, let them produce it locally.”178
However, one county commissioner representing a Missouri county
receiving property tax benefits from a new oil pipeline through the
state argued that if landowners are paid a fair price for their land, they
should accept projects that will benefit “the greater good.”179 He
questioned, “Where would we be if we had stopped all of these
projects many years ago?”180
Further east, some environmental groups in Vermont have provided
cautious support for new transmission lines to bring hydropower and
wind energy from Quebec and New York through Vermont to
southern New England states. But many interested parties question
whether such lines will only serve out-of-state generators or whether
they will provide any in-state benefits by transporting Vermont energy
resources or bringing new renewable energy resources to Vermont
customers.181
The fact that major, interstate transmission lines are subject to
frequent opposition from local residents or state regulators does not in
and of itself mean the process for siting transmission lines is broken.
History is replete with examples of large-scale infrastructure projects
176 See Jeffrey Tomich, Clean Line Transmission Project Gets Chilly Reception in Mo.,
ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/08/13/stories/
1060004417.
177 Id.
178 Id. (quoting Phillip Brown of Moberly, Mo.) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
179 Id.
180 Id. (quoting Glenn Eagan, Cnty. Comm’r, Shelbyville, Missouri) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
181 John Herrick, Renewable Energy Group Backs Vermont as Transmission Corridor,
VTDIGGER.ORG (Apr. 22, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://vtdigger.org/2014/04/22/renewableenergy-group-backs-vermont-transmission-corridor/ (“‘Is this just a super highway, or
is this going to be [a] highway with off ramps that could bring renewable energy into
Vermont communities or needed transmission so we can bring more Vermont
renewable energy into our grid? That’s what I don’t know’ . . . .” (quoting Johanna
Miller, Energy Program Dir., Vt. Natural Res. Council)). For a discussion of other
interstate transmission line projects where state PUCs denied approval because the
line would not provide power to state residents, see Hoecker & Smith, supra note 125,
at 86-88.
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that never should have been built and for which roadblocks in the
form of local siting requirements, organized opposition, or enhanced
environmental laws may have led to better outcomes.182 Nevertheless,
with regard to multi-state projects designed to meet regional
transmission and energy needs, there is a misalignment between the
scope of such projects and the state agencies and courts with authority
to review and approve those projects.
B. Fuel Sources for the Grid and Integrating Renewable Energy
Just as the 1930s and 1940s brought major changes in the sources of
energy used to heat the nation’s residences and industries, the first two
decades of the 21st century have brought significant shifts in the
sources of electricity used to power the grid. For instance, in 2013, the
percentage of net U.S. power generation from coal declined to just
39%, down from a high of 55% in 1990.183 At the same time, electricity
generated from natural gas increased to 27% in 2013, up from only

182 Major highways built through city neighborhoods and parks, which led to
urban decay and destruction of parkland, and massive hydroelectric dams in the West
with little energy benefits but significant environmental harm are just two examples.
See, e.g., San Antonio Conservation Soc’y v. Texas Highway Dep’t, 400 U.S. 968, 96869 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (expressing dismay at refusal of the Supreme Court to
review the U.S. Department of Highway’s decision to approve a highway that would
destroy a city park); St. Paul Branch of NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 764 F. Supp.
2d 1092, 1097 n.3 (D. Minn. 2011) (discussing the Rondo neighborhood of St. Paul
which was “devastated when it was divided to build Interstate Highway 94 (‘I-94’)
between Minneapolis and St. Paul” in the 1960s in reviewing a proposed light rail
project through relocated Rondo neighborhood); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE
AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986) (discussing adverse
environmental impacts and questionable benefits associated with the construction of
major federal dams and hydropower projects in the West). Indeed, the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and other federal and state environmental laws
enacted in the 1970s were intentionally designed to slow down the permitting process
so that the potential adverse environmental impacts of major projects could be
analyzed in a manner that could potentially limit those impacts or prevent projects
entirely. See generally WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, FIGHTING WESTWAY: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
CITIZEN ACTIVISM, AND THE REGULATORY WAR THAT TRANSFORMED NEW YORK CITY
(2014) (discussing the background of NEPA and explaining the federal involvement
in the permitting process).
183 See Electricity Emissions in the United States, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/technology/overview/electricity (last visited Feb. 13,
2015) [hereinafter Electricity Emissions]; Jeffrey Logan, U.S. Power Sector Undergoes
Dramatic Shift in Generation Mix, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.: RENEWABLE ENERGY
PROJECT FIN. (Feb. 26, 2013, 10:00 AM), https://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/uspower-sector-undergoes-dramatic-shift-generation-mix.
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12% in 1990.184 Non-hydropower renewables increased from
essentially zero in the late 1980s to nearly 7% by 2013.185 Moreover, in
the first quarter of 2014, for the first time, non-hydropower renewable
energy generation exceeded hydropower renewable energy generation,
which constituted just over 6% of total generation during that same
period.186 Renewable energy as a whole made up 13% of total net
electricity generation in 2013.187
To put these numbers in historical perspective, in 1950, coal
provided almost 50% of U.S. net power generation, hydropower was at
30%, natural gas was at just under 15%, petroleum was at 10%, and
non-hydropower renewables and nuclear energy were at zero.188
During the 1970s and 1980s, coal fluctuated between 45% and 55% of
total U.S. net generation, hydropower had declined to between 10%
and 20%, and natural gas remained at 15% after a brief increase to 25%
in the 1960s, while nuclear energy climbed to 20% and petroleum
declined to less than 5% of total net generation and then to less than
1% by 2013. Table 1 provides a summary of these trends.

184

See Electricity Emissions, supra note 183; Logan, supra note 183.
See Electricity Emissions, supra note 183; Logan, supra note 183.
186 See Kenneth Bossong, Non-Hydro Renewables Outproduce Hydro for First Time Ever,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (May 23, 2014), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/
rea/news/article/2014/05/non-hydro-renewables-outproduce-hydro-for-first-time-ever
(citing U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR MARCH 2014
(May 2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/current_year/
may2014.pdf) (noting data through March 31, 2014); see also Logan, supra note 183
(showing changes in energy mix for electricity).
187 Energy in Brief: How Much U.S. Electricity Is Generated from Renewable Energy?,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/renewable_
electricity.cfm (last updated Apr. 14, 2014). Although solar remains less than 1% of
total net U.S. electricity generation, its growth has been significant over the past two
years and, according to EIA, the published solar numbers understate growth in that
sector because “[u]nlike other energy sources, significant levels of solar capacity exist
in smaller, non-utility-scale applications — e.g., rooftop solar photovoltaics.” Bossong,
supra note 186.
188 See Logan, supra note 183.
185
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Table 1. U.S. Net Electricity Generation by Source189
1950

1970

1990

2013

Coal

47%

44%

55%

39%

Natural Gas

13%

22%

12%

28%

Nuclear

0%

2%

20%

20%

Hydropower

31%

18%

10%

7%

Non-Hydropower
Renewables

0%

0%

2%

6%

Petroleum

10%

18%

3%

0.7%

Notably, there are huge variations among the states in the sources of
energy they use for electricity. For instance, EIA data from 2012
indicate that West Virginia (95%), Kentucky (93%), Missouri (83%),
and North Dakota (79%) rely predominantly on coal for electricity
generation.190 By contrast, New York (4%), California (1%), and Maine
(.05%) rely very little on coal to generate electricity.191 Mississippi
(60%), California (59%), and Texas (47%) all rely on natural gas to
generate a significant percentage of electricity in the state.192 And
Idaho (58%), Washington (69%), and Oregon (56%) rely mostly on
hydropower for their electricity needs.193
This same variation exists to an even greater degree with regard to
non-hydropower renewable energy. For many years now, wind energy
has been the main driver in increasing the percentage of nonhydropower renewable energy on the grid. In 2013, wind power in the
United States, which produced over 61,000 MW of electric generating
capacity, exceeded 4% of the U.S. power grid for the first time.194
189 See Electricity Emissions, supra note 183; Logan, supra note 183. Percentages in
Table 1 are approximate.
190 Facts & Figures — According to EIA Data, AM. COAL. FOR CLEAN COAL ELEC.:
AM.’S POWER (July 2013), http://www.americaspower.org/according-to-eia-data
(summarizing 2013 EIA data).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 See Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, American Wind Power Reaches Major
Power Generation Milestones in 2013 (Mar. 5, 2013), available at http://www.awea.org/
MediaCenter/pressrelease.aspx?ItemNumber=6184 [hereinafter AWEA Press Release];
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According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, there exists
over 10 million MW of onshore wind resources in the United States,
enough to power 10 times the nation’s total electricity needs.195 At the
start of 2014, there were 12,000 MW of additional wind project
capacity under construction. That growth may slow in future years,
however, based on the potential expiration of the production tax
credit for wind, low natural gas prices, and low growth in demand for
new electricity.196 But there is significant variation in the use of wind
power for generating capacity among the states. For instance, wind
power now exceeds 25% of total electricity production in both Iowa
and South Dakota and provides more than 12% of electricity
production in nine states and over 5% in twelve states.197 As a result of
these increases, wind is now the fifth largest electricity source in the
United States, behind coal, natural gas, nuclear, and hydropower.198
All renewable energy sources together, such as wind, solar, and
hydropower, provide nearly 13% of the U.S. electricity supply.199 But
in many states, particularly in the southeast, wind generates virtually
no electricity at all.200 And Texas has installed over 12,000 MW of
wind energy on its own, more than double the amount produced by
the next highest ranked states.201 These regional variations highlight
the need for a regional or national approach to transmission siting to
meet current concerns associated with integrating non-fossil fuel
energy resources into the grid on a more widespread basis.
Both state renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”) that exist in more
than twenty-five states and EPA’s 2014 Clean Power Plan proposed
rule will lead to increased renewable energy generation throughout the
country and increased trading of renewable energy credits (“RECs”).
RPSs require utilities to generate a certain percentage — generally
Installed Wind Capacity, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY: WINDEXCHANGE, http://apps2.eere.
energy.gov/wind/windexchange/wind_installed_capacity.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2015);
Wind Energy Facts at a Glance, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/Resources/
Content.aspx?ItemNumber=5059&navItemNumber=742 (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
195 AWEA Press Release, supra note 194.
196 Id.; Logan, supra note 183; see Annual Energy Outlook 2015: Market Trends:
Electricity Demand, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/
forecasts/aeo/MT_electric.cfm.
197 AWEA Press Release, supra note 194.
198 Id. See generally Logan, supra note 183 (displaying a graph showing significant
decrease in coal for electricity and significant increases in natural gas and nonhydropower renewables).
199 AWEA Press Release, supra note 194.
200 See Installed Wind Capacity, supra note 194.
201 Id.
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between 15% and 30% — of the electricity they sell from renewable
energy resources by 2020, 2025, 2030, or a similar date, or purchase
RECs from other in-state or out-of-state power providers, thus
creating interstate markets for renewable energy.202
Under EPA’s Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, released in June 2014,
the electric power sector would be required to reduce carbon emissions
by 30% from 2005 levels by 2030.203 Under the rule, states would be
required to implement plans to achieve this goal. While the means of
obtaining compliance would vary from state to state, EPA projects that
by 2030, coal-fired electricity would drop to about 30% of the nation’s
total electricity supply, with significant increases in the use of natural gas
and renewable energy sources in addition to energy efficiency
improvements.204 EPA’s rule also allows the purchase of RECs to meet
the rule’s requirements, which will spur additional generation of
renewable energy and sales of credits in those states with ample
renewable energy resources.205 Thus, the shift away from coal and
towards both natural gas and renewable energy will increase in future
years. Even though in 2012 coal provided only 39% of U.S. net electricity
generation, it was responsible for approximately 75% of U.S. electricityrelated GHG emissions, thus explaining EPA’s focus on reducing the use
of coal-fired power in order to meet climate change goals.206
202 See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality,
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127, 155
(2014); U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE OF STATE
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Sept. 2014), http://ncsolarcenprod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/RPS_map.pdf.
203 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATES: SETTING STATE
GOALS TO CUT CARBON POLLUTION 1 (2014), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2014-05/documents/20140602fs-setting-goals.pdf; Nathanael Massey,
Proposed EPA Power Plant Rule Launches a New Experiment in Federalism, CLIMATEWIRE
(June 3, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2014/06/03/stories/1060000595.
204 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY , supra note 203; Coral Davenport, Key Details of
E.P.A. Carbon Emissions Proposal, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/06/03/us/politics/key-details-of-epa-carbon-emissions-proposal.html (“The E.P.A.
expects that under the regulation, 30 percent of electricity in the United States will still
come from coal by 2030, down from about 40 percent today.”); Edward Felker, EPA Sets
30 Percent Power Plant Carbon Cut by 2030, ENERGY GUARDIAN (June 2, 2014),
http://www.energyguardian.net/epa-sets-30-percent-power-plant-carbon-cut-2030 (“EPA
projected that coal-fired electricity will drop under the plan to about 30 percent of the
nation’s electricity supply by [2030], down from about 37 percent in 2012.”).
205 See Nick Juliano, EPA Proposal Puts States with Abundant Green Power in Catbird
Seat, GREENWIRE (June 3, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2014/06/03/stories/
1060000624.
206 See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Electricity Sector Emissions, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/electricity.html
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C. Regional Grid Governance and RTOs
Unlike the national network of federally-sited interstate pipelines
used to transport natural gas throughout the nation, the U.S.
transmission grid is cleanly divided into the three, distinct
interconnections.207 Within these three transmission grids, ISOs and
RTOs are FERC-approved nongovernmental agencies that manage
portions of the transmission grid and regional markets for wholesale
power for much of the country. From electricity’s early days,
bordering utilities long had coordinated with each other. Eventually,
groups of neighboring utilities, especially in geographically smaller
states, formed “power pools,” or “tight power pools,” that operated in
sync with each other.208 Beginning in 1999 with Order 2000, FERC
encouraged power pools to cede operation of their transmission
systems to RTOs or ISOs that would also run power markets in the
region.209

(last updated July 2, 2014).
207 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
208 See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 435-39 (discussing RTOs); NAVIGANT
CONSULTING, INC., TRANSMISSION PLANNING WHITE PAPER 6-10 (Jan. 2014), http://www.
naruc.org/grants/Documents/Transmission%20Planning%20Whitepaper.pdf (detailing
history of development of power pools and RTOs).
209 See generally id. (explaining history and functions of RTOs); Hari M. Osofsky &
Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 44-55
(discussing RTOs).
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Figure 2: Regional Transmission Organizations210

RTOs and ISOs tend to have three key functions. The first is that
these groups — which are typically non-profit organizations formed
by member utilities, independent power producers, municipalities,
cooperatives, and other players in the electricity market — physically
run, operate, and help plan the transmission grid. Utilities that built
the grid maintain their ownership in the physical lines, but the RTO or
ISO handles day-to-day operation of the system. Second, RTOs and
ISOs typically operate and set prices for the wholesale electricity
markets within their jurisdictions. Finally, RTOs and ISOs play a
major role in planning the expansion of electricity grids within their
footprints.211
Membership in RTOs is voluntary and utilities may join RTOs or
leave them at will.212 For instance, in 2013, Entergy, a major utility
with a significant presence in Mississippi and Louisiana, joined MISO,
significantly expanding that RTO’s footprint and prompting MISO to
change its name from the Midwest Independent System Operator to
the Midcontinent Independent System Operator to reflect its new

210 Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO),
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N (last updated June 15, 2015), http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/electric/indus-act/rto/elec-ovr-rto-map.pdf.
211 DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 436-39.
212 Id.
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geographic scope.213 Although FERC initially considered making
membership in an RTO mandatory, it eventually instead required that
public utilities either join a FERC-approved RTO or report on their
progress toward joining one. Political opposition and industry
resistance from utilities in the Southeast and West have so far
prevented more complete coverage of the U.S. electric grid by RTOs
but that may change in future years.214 As shown in Figure 2, RTOs
cover approximately two-thirds of the U.S. population and meet
approximately the same amount of U.S. electricity demand.215
In parts of the United States where RTOs do govern many aspects of
electricity transmission, both FERC and the courts have in recent
years enhanced the importance of these organizations. For instance,
FERC Order 1000 directs electricity providers to formally cooperate to
consider the benefits of interstate transmission.216 Each public utility
transmission provider must participate in a regional transmission
planning process through an RTO or otherwise; establish transmission
needs based on “public policy” requirements, which include state
RPSs and other federal laws and regulations; and coordinate with
transmission providers in neighboring regions to determine the most
cost-effective solutions to mutual transmission needs.217 Order 1000
213 See Press Release, Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., MISO Completes
Largest-Ever Power Grid Integration (Dec. 19, 2013), available at https://www.
misoenergy.org/AboutUs/MediaCenter/PressReleases/Pages/MISOCOMPLETESLARGESTEVERPOWERGRIDINTEGRATION.aspx; About Us: Media Center, MIDCONTINENT INDEP.
SYS. OPERATOR, INC., https://www.misoenergy.org/AboutUs/MediaCenter/pages/
MediaCenter.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). See generally MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS.
OPERATOR, INC., CORPORATE INFORMATION (2014), available at https://www.misoenergy.org/
Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/Corporate/Corporate%20Fact%20Sheet.
pdf (calling itself “[t]he Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.”); About Us:
History, MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, INC., https://www.misoenergy.org/AboutUs/
History/Pages/History.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (describing the history of MISO).
214 DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 436-37.
215 See supra Figure 2; see also MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 4.
216 See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, Docket No. RM10-23-000, Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶
61,051, at 1-2 (2011), available at www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2011/072111/
E-6.pdf; see also DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 465-66 (discussing FERC Order No.
1000).
217 Id.; Christopher James & Ken Colburn, Opportunity Knocks for Air Regulators:
FERC Order 1000, EM, Sept. 2013, at 28, 30-31, available at http://www.raponline.org/
document/download/id/6724. See generally Jim Hoecker, FERC’s Order No. 1000:
What You Need to Know, INTELLIGENT UTIL., May–June 2013, at 37, available at
http://www.huschblackwell.com/~/media/Files/BusinessInsights/BusinessInsights/2013/
05/FERCs%20Order%20No%201000%20What%20You%20Need%20to%20Know%
20Part%201__/Files/FERCs%20Order%20No%201000/FileAttachment/Article2_
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also eliminates certain incumbent utilities’ “right of first refusal” to
build transmission lines within their territories in order to allow
market forces to spur the development of new transmission lines. One
of the purposes of Order 1000 is to prioritize lines to serve renewable
energy goals and make those lines more affordable.218 Thus, Order
1000 mandates a regional transmission planning process for the first
time with RTOs playing a central role in the process in the areas where
they exist, and places regional planning process requirements on all
public utility transmission providers regardless of whether they are
part of an RTO. In 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
upheld FERC’s authority under the FPA to impose the requirements of
Order 1000 on utilities in the face of multiple legal challenges.219
Another development that highlights the growing importance of
RTOs is the 2013 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC.220 In that
case, Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court, reviewed FERC’s
approval of a request by MISO to impose a tariff on its 130 members to
fund construction of new high-voltage power lines known as “multivalue projects” or MVPs.221 The tariff is designed to finance the
construction of transmission lines to bring wind energy generated in
the western portion of MISO (i.e., Iowa, North Dakota, Minnesota) to
urban centers further east within MISO. MISO allocated the cost of the
MVPs among the utilities drawing power from the MISO grid in
proportion to each utility’s share of the region’s total wholesale
consumption of electricity rather than focusing on the extent to which
each utility’s customers would actually use the lines. In other words,
MISO allocated the costs across the entire region based on electricity
use, which meant utilities serving urban centers would pay more even
though the lines to be built were often quite distant from those urban
centers. The FPA requires that all fees imposed (or approved) by
FERC be “just and reasonable” which the courts have interpreted as
being “at least roughly proportionate to the anticipated benefits to a

IntelligentUtility_Hoecker_May2013.pdf (questioning the likely effectiveness of Order
No. 1000).
218 See Claire Kreycik, Transmission for Renewables: Opportunity in FERC Order 1000,
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.: RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECT FIN. (Jan. 16, 2012, 4:54
PM), https://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/transmission-renewables-opportunityferc-order-1000.
219 See, e.g., S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(upholding the FERC’s authority).
220 Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 770 (7th Cir. 2013).
221 Id. at 771.
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utility of being able to use the grid.”222 Notably, in an earlier decision
written by Judge Posner in 2009, also entitled Illinois Commerce
Commission v. FERC, the court had struck down a transmission cost
allocation tariff the PJM RTO had attempted to impose on its members
to finance interstate transmission lines on grounds that PJM and FERC
had failed to sufficiently estimate the costs and benefits for FPA
compliance.223
In its 2013 decision, however, the court affirmed the broad cost
allocation for the MVP lines and in doing so focused on the
importance of renewable energy, grid reliability, and transmission
expansion on a regional basis.224 The court discussed the difficulty of
meeting state RPSs without interstate transmission lines to move large
amounts of wind power from the windy, lightly populated plains in
the middle of the country to the coasts where more people live; the
environmental and energy security benefits associated with developing
domestic renewable energy; and the importance of taking those
benefits into account when considering the costs of connecting remote
wind farms to the grid and who should pay.225 This decision, by
deferring to MISO’s allocation of costs and benefits, allows RTOs
much greater leeway in planning for regional transmission upgrades
and imposing those costs on a regional rather than a local basis. In
order words, it reaffirms and to some extent expands the importance
of RTOs and regional entities in general in managing the grid and
making important decisions for the grid on a regional basis. This
authority for regional governance of the transmission grid stands in
contrast to the natural gas pipeline network. While Congress shifted
authority over pipelines directly from the states to the federal
government, in regards to the transmission grid, there is already a
significant role for regional entities, even if their authority does not yet
include siting or eminent domain power.

222

Id. at 770.
Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2009).
224 Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 721 F.3d at 774-75.
225 Id. at 771, 775, 778. But see Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 756 F.3d 556,
564-65 (7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting FERC approval of PJM cost-allocation for highvoltage transmission lines within the PJM region for failure to sufficiently calculate
costs and benefits of the lines).
223
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IV. NEXT STEPS: THE ELECTRIC GRID AT A CROSSROADS AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR A REGIONAL SOLUTION
The regulatory structure for interstate electric transmission lines no
longer matches current policy preferences regarding the use of
renewable energy resources and for many decades has not matched
either the contours of the physical grid or electricity markets. Until
recently, however, it was difficult to argue for a change in the status
quo. Of course, interstate transmission lines have always been difficult
to site and build in light of landowner, environmental group, and
sometimes state agency opposition, as well as the patchwork of state
laws governing siting and eminent domain. But until now, state siting
laws have not created any real crisis in electricity access as existed
with regard to natural gas access in the 1940s.
As described in Part I, the history of the development of U.S. energy
transportation infrastructure illustrates that there have been critical
points in time where the federal government has stepped in to address
a national need for energy infrastructure development and created a
federal siting process that displaces state law. With regard to natural
gas pipelines, by the 1940s the nation’s businesses, industries, and
homes had become dependent on natural gas. At that same time, states
were refusing to allow interstate pipelines to be constructed because
those pipelines did not provide a direct, public use for state residents.
When natural gas shortages on the East Coast resulted in significant
industry layoffs in the winter of 1946–1947 as a result of regional
natural gas shortages, Congress responded by amending the Natural
Gas Act to provide nationwide siting, permitting, and eminent domain
authority for interstate natural gas pipelines.226 This federal process
has resulted in more certainty of investment for natural gas pipelines,
allowing them to be permitted and built often within a year or two of
when first proposed. Notably, the lack of alternative means of
transporting natural gas apart from pipelines may well have led to the
push for federal siting and eminent domain for interstate lines. With
pipelines the only means of economically transporting natural gas,
state interference with siting those pipelines was an insurmountable
obstacle to transporting the energy resource itself.
The electric grid now appears to be faced with a similar dilemma
approximately seventy years later. Because coal, natural gas, and
uranium can be transported by truck, train, and pipeline, utilities have
historically been able to use those methods of transportation to bring
traditional energy resources to power plants built close to load centers,
226

See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.

1942

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 48:1895

and then build shorter transmission lines to connect power plants to
customers. Likewise, to the extent utilities in different states wished to
join RTOs or ISOs to share resources and create regional grids, they
could plan and build lines under state law and, if the economics
favored a new interstate line, resources could be pooled to undertake
the often decade-long path to build such lines and those costs could be
passed on to ratepayers under state law. But with efforts to integrate
more wind and other renewable energy resources into the electric grid,
state siting laws have increasingly posed a real barrier to transporting
the energy resource itself.
Do changes in the electricity realm justify creating a new regulatory
framework to enhance the interstate transmission network to take
advantage of abundant wind and solar energy resources? Do the
environmental, reliability, and energy security benefits of renewable
energy outweigh the costs as well as the likely opposition of state
regulators and state residents? Certainly, the history of natural gas
pipeline regulation shows that Congress is able to move beyond state
authority in the energy law context when there is a drive to turn what
has historically been a locally constrained energy resource into a
national one. Today, natural gas provides a reliable form of energy for
heating and cooking for U.S. residents and industries throughout the
country. And now, with new domestic natural gas resources made
available by hydraulic fracturing technologies, that same interstate
natural gas pipeline network has served to transport gas to power
plants across the country for electricity generation purposes,
displacing coal and the adverse environmental impacts associated with
coal. But none of that development likely could have happened, or
happened as rapidly, without the creation at a national level of an
interstate transportation network able to transform natural gas into a
national energy resource.
The United States is facing a similar decision with regard to a
growing number of policies and priorities designed to promote much
more widespread use of renewable energy, which requires major
expansions in the electric grid. The existing electric grid can support
renewable energy as a local resource, transporting it from one part of
Texas to another or from North Dakota to Minnesota. Moreover, the
existence of RECs allows local development of renewable energy to
“count” for reductions in states that do not have such ample resources
available.227 But REC markets alone will not be enough to integrate the
227 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1810-11 (discussing RECs and the impact
of various state RPSs on renewable energy development in nearby states).
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scale of renewable energy necessary to move that electricity resource
into a more dominant position nationwide. Thus, the difficulties faced
by utilities, merchant transmission companies, and others attempting
to build long distance transmission lines to serve today’s regional grids
and meet state and federal renewable energy targets and carbon
reduction mandates highlight the limitations of the existing statebased siting framework. These renewable electricity resources,
particularly wind, will remain trapped where they are least needed
unless there is a new regulatory structure to consider the benefits and
costs of those lines.
One option is for Congress to adopt the model that currently exists
for interstate natural gas pipelines. Under the Natural Gas Act, a
natural gas pipeline operator obtains a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity from FERC, which in turn allows the
operator to exercise nationwide eminent domain authority along the
path of the pipeline if it is not able to enter into voluntary easements
with all the landowners.228 This would eliminate many of the
roadblocks to the interstate transmission lines needed to bring wind
and solar energy from resource-rich parts of the countries to
population centers. Indeed, as early as 1994, Professor Richard Pierce
noted that without federal siting authority, the interstate electric
transmission grid could never obtain the level of cost control and
reliability enjoyed by the interstate natural gas pipeline system.229 This
has become even more true twenty years later, in 2015, as the United
States attempts to integrate increasing amounts of renewable energy
into the grid that can be generated cheaply in the Midwest (wind) and
Southwest (solar) but must be transported to population centers
where both demand and electricity prices are high to be cost-effective.
Adopting a federal siting and eminent domain framework would
eliminate the need to obtain multiple state approvals for interstate
transmission lines and allow FERC to consider national and regional
benefits of grid expansion. Similar to regulation under the Natural Gas
Act, states and other interested parties could have significant
involvement in the permitting process but ultimately it would be
FERC that would have decision-making authority. This would allow
the entire nation to have regulatory authority, renewable resources,
and population centers all within a single jurisdiction — a situation
that exists today only in the state of Texas and cannot be replicated
228 Id. at 1859-60 (discussing federal siting and eminent domain process for
interstate natural gas pipelines).
229 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in
Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323, 333-34 (1994).
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elsewhere under the current legal framework for interstate
transmission lines.230
But while there is historical precedent in the natural gas industry for
completely replacing state siting authority with federal siting
authority, there are also good arguments that a fully centralized
approach may not be the best model for modernizing today’s electric
grid. First, the Natural Gas Act came on the heels of significant New
Deal legislation, including the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
the Social Security Act of 1935 and the establishment of the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 1934.231 At that time, the political
climate favored significant new federal regulation of markets and
monopolies by Congress and by new federal agencies Congress
created.232 The Natural Gas Act was an effort to apply these principles
to natural gas markets and transportation as states struggled to
regulate interstate pipeline companies and the rates they charged.233
The Natural Gas Act filled that gap by providing federal regulation of
interstate pipeline companies, rates, and the infrastructure needed to
create a federal natural gas pipeline transportation system. Clearly, the
political climate is quite different today.
Even putting aside the difference in the political climate between
1938 and 2015, there are other reasons that the “fix” for expanding
interstate natural gas pipelines in 1938 may not be ideal for expanding
interstate electric transmission lines in 2015. In 1938, there were no
regional entities with any authority or expertise associated with
natural gas rates, markets, or interstate pipelines. Thus, the only
potential replacement for state regulation, which was seen as
inadequate, was the federal government. In 2015, the situation is quite
different with regard to electricity markets, rates, and interstate
transmission lines. RTOs and ISOs provide significant authority and
expertise in connection with setting wholesale electricity rates,
planning for new transmission lines, and acting as a forum where
230 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1843-47 (discussing unique ability of
Texas to engage in cost-effective integration of renewable energy because it has its
own transmission grid, ample renewable resources, and major population centers
within a single jurisdiction with regulatory authority).
231 Id. at 1862.
232 See Hiram Caton, Progressivism and Conservatism During the New Deal: A
Reinterpretation of American Political Traditions, in THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACY:
CRITIQUE AND REAPPRAISAL 177, 183-84 (Robert Eden ed., 1989); Ellis W. Hawley, The
New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, in THE NEW DEAL: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 73, 78 (Alonzo L. Hamby ed., 1969).
233 See John T. Miller, Jr., Competition in Regulated Industries: Interstate Natural Gas
Pipelines, 47 GEO. L.J. 224, 230 (1958).
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multiple stakeholders, including regulated entities, consumer
interests, and states can collaborate on these issues. Even where RTOs
and ISOs do not exist, regional transmission line planning among
utilities is well-developed, and entities like the WAPA and the
Western Electricity Coordinating Council (“WECC”) serve as
umbrella organizations for many sub-regional planning efforts within
the Western Interconnection.234 These regional planning efforts will
become even more robust in future years as a result of FERC Order
1000, issued in 2011, which mandates that all utilities engage in
regional planning efforts regardless of whether they are part of a RTO
or ISO.235 Thus, there is an existing level of expertise and regulatory
authority at the regional level with regards to the electric industry that
simply did not exist in 1938 in the natural gas industry.
Finally, a completely federal approach to interstate transmission line
siting may not sufficiently take into account local conditions and
concerns.236 As Professor Ashira Ostrow has aptly summarized:
The unpredictability of infrastructure needs, combined with
the permanence of infrastructure improvements, means that
regulators will make the wrong choice, at least in some cases,
and that the impact of those choices will constrain energy
policy for decades to come. Eliminating the states and
centralizing authority in a federal agency magnifies that risk
fifty times over.
Moreover, federal regulation may, at times, be insufficiently
sensitive to local concerns and conditions. Particularly with
regard to infrastructure siting, state and local regulators, who
are a part of and politically accountable to the local
community, are more likely to be familiar with local

234

See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1855-57 (discussing WAPA and WECC).
See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, Docket No. RM10-23-000, Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶
61,051, at 1-2 (2011), available at www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2011/
072111/E-6.pdf. In 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld
FERC’s authority to impose the requirements of Order 1000 on utilities in the face of
numerous challenges. See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 63 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
236 See Ostrow, Grid Governance, supra note 1, at 2015-16 (arguing that
centralizing authority for energy infrastructure magnifies their inherent risks “fifty
times over”).
235
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conditions and responsive to local preferences than are federal
administrators.237
As a result of these concerns, policymakers should seriously
consider a regional approach to transmission line siting. This idea is
not completely new. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Professor James
Landis suggested a regional approach to electricity regulation as far
back as 1925 in a Yale Law Journal article.238 Even at that early date,
they recognized “[t]he regional characteristic of electric power, as a
social and engineering fact, must find a counterpart in the effort of law
to deal with it.”239 Since that time, the regional growth of the electric
grid has resulted in the rise of RTOs, regional approaches to
transmission planning, and the creation of regional electricity markets.
But so far these regional structures have had no impact on regulatory
authority over transmission siting. Nevertheless, in the area of
transmission siting, policymakers should consider regional options in
addition to either the status quo or a complete transfer of siting
authority to FERC under the interstate natural gas pipeline model.
The Subparts below discuss the various regional options.
A. Interstate Compacts Under EPAct 2005 to Create Regional Siting
Authorities
There is the potential under existing federal law to create new,
regional entities to site interstate transmission lines. As discussed
earlier, EPAct 2005 has not succeeded to date in granting DOE and
FERC sufficient backstop authority to site interstate transmission lines
in NIETCs.240 But a separate provision of the legislation allows three
or more contiguous states to enter into interstate compacts to establish
regional siting authorities to determine the need for future
transmission facilities within those states and carry out the
transmission siting responsibilities of those states.241 Under the
237

Id. at 2015-16.
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution —
A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 717 (1925).
239 Id.
240 See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text (discussing EPAct 2005,
NIETCs, and backstop siting authority).
241 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 216(i), 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2012). The Compact
Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of
Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .” U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. For a discussion of the Compact Clause in the context of
electricity regulation, see Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 238, at 717. See generally
Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of
238
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statute, the siting authority would have power to “review, certify, and
permit siting of transmission facilities,” including facilities in
NIETCs.242 To date, no states have entered into such compacts and
there is currently no real incentive for them to do so. But what if
Congress gave states the option of entering into such compacts and, if
they refused to do so within a set time period, siting authority would
transfer to FERC? This would give states a choice to cede authority to
a regional entity that would be more focused on local concerns or give
up siting authority altogether. Congress could also use as an
alternative incentive additional funds for transmission grid-related
projects for those states that enter into compacts and create regional
siting authorities. Thus, through new legislation, Congress could
encourage rather than force states to move to a regional siting model.
Notably, the Council of State Governments through its National
Center for Interstate Compacts (“NCIC”) has created online resources
for states, including model transmission line compact language, in an
effort to encourage states to create interstate compacts.243 In the model
compact, the NCIC states one of the “purposes” of the compact is to
recognize that “states have a vested interest in retaining their
sovereignty and that EPACT 2005 authorizes interstate compacts that
can forestall federal preemptive acts if states cooperatively develop a
transmission siting process.”244 The model compact would create: (1)
“A state project review panel within each member state, consisting of
three or more members, to coordinate the views of different agencies
and interests within the state;” (2) “[a] combined multi-state siting
authority, consisting of the states affected by a particular project
proposal, authorized to make siting decisions for that project;” and (3)
“[a]n Interstate Compact Commission, which provides administrative
support and rulemaking capability.”245
It is clear that at the time the NCIC created its model compact, there
were hopes that state concerns regarding exercise of federal backstop
siting authority under EPAct 2005 would incentivize states to enter
Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing the benefits and democratic
concerns of interstate compacts).
242 Energy Policy Act § 216(i).
243 See Transmission Line Siting Compact, NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS,
http://www.csg.org/NCIC/TransmissionLineSitingCompact.aspx (last visited Feb. 19,
2015).
244 NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS, ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINE SITING COMPACT
1, available at http://www.csg.org/NCIC/documents/Electric%20Transmission%20Line%
20Siting%20Compact%20-%20November%20Final%20Draft.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2015).
245 Id. at 5.
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into compacts to avoid an override of state authority.246 But since the
courts have not supported DOE and FERC’s efforts in that area,247
there is currently no real incentive for states to cede any power to a
multi-state siting authority. Moreover, there is a dearth of successful
regional governance regimes in the United States in light of the
historic dominance of federal-state-local approaches to regulation in
most areas of the law.248 Nevertheless, that could change if: (1)
Congress strengthened federal siting authority beyond what currently
exists in EPAct 2005; or (2) a group of states determined that their
renewable energy resources were sufficiently valuable for export as a
result of new state or federal clean energy policies or financial
incentives that it would justify entering into a compact to streamline
siting authority for the necessary transmission lines to export those
energy resources. In this way, either fear of federal preemption or
market factors could create the necessary incentives for interstate
transmission line siting compacts and allow use of the existing
interstate compact authority in EPAct 2005.249
B. RTO Siting Authority
A second option is for Congress to grant transmission line siting
authority to RTOs within their footprints. Since the start of the
twenty-first century, RTOs and ISOs have played a central role in
regional transmission planning and electricity markets in many parts
of the country.250 FERC and the federal courts have supported those
efforts, with FERC Order 1000 and the 2013 Illinois Commerce
246

See id. at 1.
See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
interpretations of EPAct 2005 backstop siting provisions).
248 See, e.g., Frank P. Darr, Electric Holding Company Regulation by Multistate
Compact, 14 ENERGY L.J. 357 (1993) (discussing the problems with regional
regulation).
249 See, e.g., id. at 374 (citing literature concluding that interstate compacts are only
successful when they are “perceived as a last resort — other forms of regulation are
not perceived as options”); Hasday, supra note 241, at 11 (“[S]tates should resort to
compacts only when their advantages are most compelling: when the problem at hand
requires a regional response; when any interstate agreement must be a compact
because it may infringe on federal authority; when Congress is unable or unwilling to
act; and when the compact agreement itself is drafted to mitigate democratic
concerns.”).
250 See, e.g., Regional Transmission Organizations, Docket No. RM99-2-000, Order
No. 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999) (setting forth requirements for utilities to join
RTOs or report on progress towards doing so as well as RTO characteristics and
functions); DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 436-39 (discussing RTOs and ISOs).
247
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Commission decision serving as just two examples of that support.
Notably, RTOs and ISOs, where they exist, have a history of creating a
forum for a diverse number of stakeholders, including state PUCs,
utilities, consumer advocates, non-utility electricity providers, and
local governments.251 Thus, RTO-led transmission line siting has the
potential for creating an open and inclusive forum for resolving multistate and multi-party siting issues.
With the exception of Texas, which has major population centers,
ample renewable energy resources, and its own electric grid within the
boundaries of one state, RTOs are the only existing legal entity other
than the federal government with jurisdiction over a transmission
grid, major population centers, and ample renewable energy resources.
No single state other than Texas can bring all of these elements
together under one umbrella, which suggests a regional approach for
the remainder of the country.252 To accomplish this goal, Congress
would need to expressly grant authority to RTOs to site transmission
lines or states would need to cede some of their authority to the RTO
through an interstate compact or some other legal means.253
One potential obstacle to this approach is that RTOs are nongovernmental organizations, and thus do not easily “fit” within the
types of entities that generally engage in the rulemaking and
adjudicative functions normally exercised by a governmental body.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in 2015 in a
case involving whether Congress unconstitutionally delegated
regulatory authority to a private corporation when it authorized
Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Authority to jointly develop
standards that would govern Amtrak as well as other rail carriers in
the Passenger Railroad Investment and Improvement Act of 2008. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the delegation was
unconstitutional because Amtrak was a private corporation, but the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that Amtrak was in fact a
governmental entity.254 In many ways, however, granting siting
251

See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 209, at 52.
See Wald, Wired for Wind, supra note 163, at B1 (explaining that Texas is in a
much better position to build long distance transmission lines for wind energy than
the rest of the country because “Texas is one of only three states with borders roughly
contiguous with a grid operator, putting its electric system under the control of a
single legislature and a single public utilities commission, and it is by far the largest in
that category”).
253 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1867-69 (discussing EPAct 2005
provisions allowing states to enter into interstate compacts to create regional siting
agencies).
254 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1226 (2015).
252
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authority to RTOs differs from the issue in the Amtrak case because
RTOs do not own or operate transmission lines and thus would not be
making decisions that impact their own interests directly, even if an
RTO may indirectly benefit from a new line because it would ease
congestion on a grid that it manages.
Even apart from these distinctions, there is precedent for allowing a
hybrid organization like an RTO to exercise such authority in the
context of the electric grid. NERC, the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation, is a not-for-profit entity composed of utility
and other members. It long has served as an umbrella organization
providing standards to help maintain the reliability of the bulk
transmission system in the United States.255 In EPAct 2005, after the
2003 Northeast blackouts, Congress authorized FERC to designate an
electric reliability organization (“ERO”) to ensure grid reliability and
also granted FERC oversight authority over the ERO. In 2006, FERC
designated NERC to be the ERO.256 Today, NERC, working with eight
regional entities, proposes reliability standards and cyber security
standards to FERC and has authority — with FERC oversight — to
impose fines up to $1 million daily and to engage in other
enforcement actions against utilities and other grid participants for
failure to comply with those standards. Thus, there is precedent even
within the electricity realm for a private, nonprofit entity to exercise
quasi-governmental authority with regards to electric grid
development and management with federal oversight.257
Moreover, it is certainly possible to give RTOs siting and eminent
domain authority for interstate transmission lines without completely
transferring regulatory authority over transmission lines from the
states to RTOs. Railroads and public utilities, for instance, have
eminent domain authority and in some cases siting authority for
building necessary infrastructure, but regulatory authority and
oversight of those industries continues to remain with state and
federal governmental entities.258 Thus, Congress could create very
255 See supra note 144 (discussing NERC); see also DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at
463 (describing NERC and reliability standards).
256 See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 209, at 37; see also DAVIES ET AL., supra
note 48, at 463.
257 See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 209, at 36-37.
258 See Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 25659 (2011) (discussing state siting of power plants); Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of
Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 233-37, 247 (2012) (discussing federal regulation
and siting regimes for railroads and energy generation facilities); Hannah Wiseman et
al., Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables Component, 29 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 827, 849-50 (2011) (discussing state eminent domain authority for

2015]

The Electric Grid at a Crossroads

1951

limited authority within RTOs to site transmission lines without
ceding additional authority to regulate those lines, thus avoiding some
of the unconstitutional delegation problems raised in the Amtrak case.
C. New Mandates on the States to Consider Regional Need
A final and more modest option is to leave siting and eminent
domain authority with the states but require states to affirmatively
consider regional benefits in making siting and eminent domain
determinations. Thus, in any siting or eminent domain proceeding for
an interstate transmission line, federal law would require state PUCs
and state courts to consider regional “need” and regional “public use”
rather than in-state need and public use under existing state laws. If
Congress followed this path, it could use as a model the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TCA”).259 Congress enacted the
TCA to increase competition in the telecommunications industry and
expand wireless service nationwide.260 At the time, local zoning boards
and city councils across the country were denying and delaying
approval of cell phone towers in response to local citizen concerns. In
response, instead of transferring siting authority away from local
governments to a federal authority, Congress used the siting
provisions of the TCA to: (1) prevent local governments from banning
facilities outright; (2) ban unreasonable discrimination among
providers; (3) require local authorities to respond to siting requests
within a reasonable time period and to make decisions in writing,
supported by substantial evidence; and (4) grant parties denied a
siting permit the right to sue the local government in federal court
with the claim decided on an expedited basis.261 States and local
governments retain the right to make decision on where, how, and
when to site facilities within these federal mandates. According to
Professor Ashira Ostrow, the law has resulted in the siting of

power plants).
259 Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA), 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2012).
260 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1865 (discussing the TCA); Camille Rorer, Can
You See Me Now? The Struggle Between Cellular Towers and NIMBY, 19 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 213, 214-15 (2005).
261 See T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 814 (2015) (describing
provisions of the TCA and holding that the Act requires localities to provide reasons
in writing when they deny cell phone tower siting applications and those reasons must
be issued contemporaneously with the denial); Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1866
(describing provisions of the TCA); Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow,
Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1091-97 (2009) (same).
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thousands of new cell phone towers and significantly expanded the
development of a “national telecommunications network.”262 She
describes this siting policy as a “hybrid federal-local framework” that
balances national and local land use priorities and has encouraged
local regulators to cooperate with land use developers.263
If Congress were to take a similar approach with regard to interstate
transmission lines, it could leave siting authority with the state but
require state PUCs and courts to expressly consider regional need and
regional public use in making certificate of need and eminent domain
decisions for interstate transmission lines. State actors would be
required to document this consideration in their decisions, and
transmission line operators could seek relief in federal court for
violation of these requirements. This hybrid approach would impose
new, regional considerations on state actors, thus requiring them to
take into account the regional value of transmission lines for
renewable energy integration and grid reliability.264
All of the options above recognize the regional nature of the modern
transmission grid as well as the shortcomings of leaving siting and
eminent domain authority completely with the states under existing
state laws. In suggesting a regional approach to interstate transmission

262

Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J.
289, 293 (2011).
263 Id. at 292-93.
264 One might argue that a federal requirement that state PUCs consider regional
need in making transmission line siting decisions raises constitutional concerns
associated with the “anti-commandeering” principles in the Tenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)
(“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997) (same).
One judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2000 found that the
“substantial evidence” standard and other requirements imposed on local
governments in the cell phone tower siting provisions of the TCA were
unconstitutional based on this reasoning. See Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir. 2000) (Niemeyer, J., concurring). However,
this view did not garner a majority opinion on the Fourth Circuit, and no other circuit
has adopted its reasoning. See, e.g., id. at 691-92. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that Congress may constitutionally require state PUCs to “consider” federal
standards in state electricity ratemaking proceedings to encourage certain
cogeneration and small power facilities and to require states to enact rules to carry out
such federal policies. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-71 (1982)
(upholding provisions of PURPA that direct state PUCs to “consider” the adoption
and implementation of specific rate design regulatory standards and that require states
to implement such rules). Thus, Supreme Court precedent would appear to support
Congressional action requiring states to consider regional need among other factors in
making electric transmission line siting decisions.
ON LEGIS.
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line siting, this Article recognizes that state interests in protecting
their own regulatory authority, as well as the politics of today’s
Congress, make it difficult to envision implementing such an
approach in the near future. Nevertheless, a major regional or national
disruption, like the natural gas shortages on the East Coast in the
1940s, or the 2003 blackouts, which led to the creation of NERC, can
change political sentiment very quickly. When that day arrives, it will
be important to consider a regional approach to interstate
transmission line siting that matches today’s regional grid and regional
electricity resources in additional to a federal approach or the status
quo. Indeed, what may seem like a radical approach today may appear
inevitable in the future.
Finally, this Article’s support for a shift in siting authority to
facilitate the development of new interstate transmission lines comes
with a major caveat — it assumes that the nation will remain
dependent at least to some extent on today’s existing technology for
transporting renewable energy for many decades. It may be that there
will be significant developments in battery storage technology or some
other means of storing electric energy that will allow the transport of
wind, solar, and other renewable energy without the need for longdistance transmission lines.265 There may also be breakthroughs in
distributed solar technologies or geothermal energy that will make all
of our current assumptions about how to best transport power
obsolete. This is important not only for the massive costs associated
with expanding the electric grid but also because of the adverse
environmental and aesthetic concerns often associated with large-scale
transmission lines.266 Nevertheless, this Article assumes that for now,
265 See, e.g., Brian Huskinson, et al., A Metal-Free Organic-Inorganic Aqueous Flow
Battery, 505 NATURE 195 (2014) (reporting on the study of new battery technology to
store renewable energy); Organic Mega Flow Battery Promises Breakthrough for
Renewable Energy, HARVARD SCH. OF ENG’G & APPLIED SCIS. (Jan. 8, 2014),
http://www.seas.harvard.edu/news/2014/01/organic-mega-flow-battery-promisesbreakthrough-for-renewable-energy (describing a new battery technology that could
store electricity generated from renewable, intermittent energy sources).
266 See, e.g., Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1803 (discussing historic opposition
of environmental groups to many electric transmission lines across the country);
Evans-Brown, supra note 168 (discussing landowner and environmental group
opposition to Northern Pass transmission line designed to bring hydropower from
Quebec to population centers in New England and discussing disputes over prior
transmission lines in the region); Dustin Thaler, Strange Bedfellows: Environmental
Groups, Transmission Developers Working Together on Renewable Energy Projects, AMS.
FOR A CLEAN ENERGY GRID (Apr. 16, 2014), http://cleanenergytransmission.org/crosspost-strange-bedfellows-environmental-groups-transmission-developers-workingtogether-on-renewable-energy-projects/ (discussing historic environmental group
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long-distance transmission will remain a central component of the
U.S. electricity delivery system. As a result, because the grid is so
central to our lives, and the benefits that come with modernizing the
grid and integrating renewable energy are so significant, this Article
concludes that it is critical to address regulatory barriers to a better
transmission grid using current technological assumptions.
CONCLUSION
This Article first compares the history of the development of the
electric grid with the development of the natural gas pipeline network as
well as the regulatory history of each form of energy transportation. This
history helps explain why Congress transferred regulatory authority over
siting interstate natural gas pipelines from the states to the federal
government. With regard to natural gas, there was a moment in time in
the 1940s when the entire country was dependent on a locally
constrained energy resource and states were blocking the creation of the
interstate infrastructure necessary to transport that resource to
population centers around the country. With regard to electricity, we
have not yet experienced that “moment in time” because renewable
energy still makes up a small percentage of our total electricity
generation. But it is growing in many parts of the country, and current
policies such as state RPSs, the EPA’s Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule,
and other EPA environmental regulations that have already begun to
limit the nation’s use of coal-fired electricity will put pressure on utilities
to transport greater amounts of renewable energy to their customers.
This Article then concludes that in order to create a modern electric
grid that can support such a shift, Congress can certainly turn to FERC
as it did for interstate natural gas pipelines. But a regional siting
approach better matches the physical aspects of the grid, as well as
existing electricity markets and energy resources, all of which are or are
becoming regional in scope, and leaves siting authority closer to the
communities that the transmission lines will impact. Because of the
grid’s regional development as well as the rise of unique, regional
actors like RTOs, Congress through legislation or the states through
interstate compacts should seriously consider creating a regional
approach to siting interstate transmission lines.
opposition to transmission lines as compared to recent environmental group support
in some instances for lines designed to transport renewable energy). Another problem
with any major build-out of the transmission grid is that it may facilitate transmission
of new fossil fuel energy resources in addition to or instead of renewable energy
sources. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 1042-43.

